Durrant

People v. Durrant

Caution
116 Cal. 179·1897 Cal. LEXIS 528·48 P. 75
Supreme Court of CaliforniaMarch 3, 1897Crim. No. 196California11,254 words

Opinion

Concurring Opinion

McFarland, J.

I have signed the opinion of Mr. Justice Hensliaw, and thereby concurred in his opinion and in the judgment of affirmance. But while I can see no legal ground for a reversal of the judgment, I desire to say that the conviction of appellant would have been much more satisfactory if he had been tried in some county far beyond the reach of the threatening atmosphere which surrounded him at the place of his trial, and where the active and long continued attempts to forestall judicial inquiry and compel a hostile decision could not possibly have had much force. As the case stands it is somewhat difficult to feel sufficiently assured that outside adverse pressure *226 did not liave some insensible influence. Bat, whether or not appellant had a substantially fair trial, notwithstanding circumstances which certainly made it difficult for him to have such a trial, is a question which addressed itself, in the first instance,- to the presiding judge of the trial court; and it is not so apparent that he abused his discretion in determining that question in the affirmative, as to give this court warrant to reverse the order denying a new trial. As to the -other points involved in the appeal, I…

Lead Opinion

Henshaw, J.

The defendant, convicted of the murder of Blanche Lament, prosecutes these appeals from the judgment and from the order denying him a new trial.

Reviewing the specifications of error in their natural sequence, rather than in the order of their presentation in argument, the first which invite attention are defendant’s challenges to the panel. He contended that the list of trial jurors had not been selected or returned as required by sections 204-09 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention he offered the-record of the proceedings of the judges of the superior court in the matter. This record, kept by the secretary of the judges, was incomplete. Under direction of the presiding judge the secretary amended his record, and as amended his minutes showed a compliance with the law. The presiding judge was permitted to testify to the facts attending the selecting and listing of the trial jurors, from which it appeared that the proceedings of the judges were due and regular. Defendant’s objection that the original minutes of the secretary were the sole evidence admissible upon the question cannot be sustained. It was the inherent right of the court to correct its…

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