Buck

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment and also from the order modifying such judgment. It is the second appeal in the case. (See Buck v. City of Eureka, 109 Cal. 504 .) In pursuance of the permission given by this court in the judgment rendered in the former appeal, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint seeking compensation upon a quantum meruit for services rendered after his term of office had expired.

The defendant answered this amended complaint, and upon the trial plaintiff recovered a verdict for four thousand seven hundred dollars, for which amount judgment was entered. Soon after the entry of the judgment the court ordered it to be modified so as to express on its face that it was to be paid only out of the city revenues of certain years, then long past, and which revenues had presumably been entirely exhausted years before the judgment was rendered. This modification was made by the court upon the idea that it was required by section 18, article XT, of the constitution, which provides that “no city shall incur indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for it for such year,”…

I concur in the judgment— that the judgment of the court below must be a general one as first entered. The court below naturally followed the decisions in Weaver v. San Francisco, 111 Cal. 327 , and one or two other eases; but in Higgins v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 52 .4, it was suggested that in the former cases the attention of the court was not called to the fact that an extraordinary revenue might be raised by a vote of the people, or in some other way, for the payment of an indebtedness accruing in a previous year, and that a judgment limiting its satisfaction solely to the revenues of a previous year might embarrass such action. Therefore it was held in the Higgins case that the judgment should be general in form. T see no difficulty in determining out of what revenues any particular *47 judgment should be paid; the judgment-roll shows the nature and the time of the accruing of the cause of action. “Merely putting a demand in the form of a general judgment would not in any way take it out of the general rule that the ordinary revenues of a future year cannot be applied to the payment of a liability in a previous year, as held in Smith v. Broderick, 107 Cal. 644 ; 48 Am. St. Rep.…