Meyer

I dissent. The case is not to

my mind distinguishable in principle from that decided in Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 249 , where it was held that the trial judge was not disqualified. The interest of Judge Torrance in the subject of litigation is not different in kind, however much it may differ in degree, from that possessed by the trial judge in that case.

In my judgment the principle announced in the opinion of the court is one susceptible of indefinite extension, to the great detriment of the practical administration of justice; and the application of which to the facts of this case is, I think, opposed by the weight of modern authority.

Rehearing denied.

The plaintiff instituted an action against the city of San Diego, and against the Southern California Mountain. Water Company, for the twofold purpose: 1. Of setting aside as illegal and void a contract between the city and the water company defendant, involving an expenditure of one million five hundred thousand dollars of the moneys of the city to be obtained by the sale of its bonds; and 2. To enjoin the issuance and sale of the bonds to carry out the contract.

The bond issue had been voted at a special election called under an ordinance submitting to the electors the proposition ;of incurring a bonded debt of one million five hundred thousand dollars “for the acquisition by said city, for the use of said city and of its inhabitants, of and from the Southern California Mountain Water Company, of a water right, reservoir sites, a meterhouse site and rights of way, and for the construction by said city of waterworks for the use of said city and its inhabitants.”

The controlling acts under which the election was held and the bonds voted are the statutes relating to the issuance of municipal bonds for public improvements. (Stats. 1889, p. 399; Stats. 1891, p. 132; Stats. 1893, p.…

I concur in the judgment of reversal. I also concur generally in the opinion of Mr. Justice Henshaw, except that I desire a little more pointedly to emphasize the distinction between the case at bar, and a case where a city in which the judge is a taxpayer is a party, and where there is merely a possibility that a judgment against the city might result in an increased levy of taxes, and a judgment in favor of the city might bring about a reduction of taxation. In the Iat *113 ter case—and in others that could be mentioned where a similar principle applies—the interest is too shadowy, indirect, remote, and contingent to be within the rule that a man cannot be a judge in his own case. (See Dallas v. Peacock, 89 Tex. 58 ; Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 249 , and cases there cited.) But in the case at bar the interest of the judge was not indirect, remote, or contingent; it directly involved the immediate imposition of a special annual tax upon his property to continue for forty years.