Kuhn

This is an action of ejectment. Plaintiffs, by writing, leased certain agricultural lands to defendant for a fixed, definite period—about ten months. Upon the expiration of the lease defendant refused to give up' possession, and this action was commenced. Plaintiffs commenced the action some six weeks after the lease had expired, and defendant now rests his right of possession upon the claim that after the expiration of the lease he became a tenant at will, and by virtue of such tenancy he was entitled to a notice of thirty days (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1162) before action could be brought to eject him. In other words, his only defense is that the action is prematurely brought. There is nothing whatever.in the claim made. The defendant was not a tenant at will. Under his lease he was a tenant for years, and upon the expiration of his term it was his duty to move without notice. He had no rights of any kind which demanded a notice in writing in order that they might be cut off.

It is not the law of this state that a tenant who remains in possession, perchance a single day after the expiration of his lease, thereby becomes a tenant at will and must be served with a thirty-day notice…