Sullivan

I dissent. I am convinced from the evidence, tested by the rules of law declared in the main opinion, that the direct testimony of Riccardi as to the three acts of bribery are sufficiently supported by the other evidence to warrant the disbarment of the accused.

Speaking from the impressions I received from the record, I cannot, upon any theory consistent with his innocence, account for the refusal of the accused to hold Catterini for trial upon the evidence presented. In connection with all the other circumstances, considering the grave condition of Mrs. Nanni, and the evidence that bail was to have been denied in the beginning, the fixing of the bail at five hundred dollars cash on each of the two charges is not without significance. The gist of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder is the specific intent to take life, since the only element of murder which is lacking is the failure to execute the deadly intention. The perpetrator of such an offense is as much possessed of a malignant and abandoned heart as if he had not shown bad marksmanship, and keeping in view the hour of the assault, that the woman and child were left to die, and the other surrounding…

I dissent. If satisfactory proof of the specific offense of accepting a bribe is necessary to the disbarment of the accused under the charges in this proceeding I would be compelled to concur in the majority opinion. The only direct evidence of such bribe-taking rests on the testimony of Riccardi and his unsupported word can carry little or no weight, and, as to the actual passing of any money between the parties here, there is no corroborating evidence.

But the gist of this accusation for disbarment is not the crime of bribery, but the commission of an act of moral turpitude in the manner of disposition of certain criminal cases pending in the court over which the accused presided, and if the acts complained of are shown to have been influenced by some other corrupt motive than that of bribery, the variance in the proof in that respect ought not to defeat a judgment.

The substance of the charges here, taking the Catterini case as an example, is that in certain felony matters pending before him as a committing magistrate, the respondent was corruptly and unlawfully influenced by a bribe in his decision and disposition of said cases.

Now, bribery is not the crux of the matter,…

This is a proceeding instituted in this court for the disbarment of John J. Sullivan, an attorney and counselor, for conduct involving moral turpitude. Defendant was at all the times mentioned in the accusation one of the police judges of the city arid county of San Francisco, and all the charges against him are for acts and conduct on his part with relation to matters coming before him as such police judge, our law providing that an attorney and counselor may be removed “for the commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the same be committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or counselor at law, or otherwise.” (Code Civ. Proc., subd. 5, sec. 287.) Three separate, specific charges against the accused are made by the accusation. Each charge involves the most serious accusation that can be made against a judicial officer, viz., that of agreeing to receive and receiving money upon the corrupt understanding and agreement that his official conduct shall be thereby influenced. All of the charges were denied by the accused by verified answer filed herein. This court retained jurisdiction of the matter instead of transferring it to a…

I concur in the judgment and the majority opinion, but in order to prevent so far as possible any misunderstanding, I would epitomize what, as I understand it, is the final attitude toward the cause of the majority of the court and what is certainly my own attitude.

The question involved is, of course, purely one of fact, and is to be determined by each of us in accordance with the final impression made upon his mind by the evidence. The impression made upon my mind is one of very strong suspicion that the defendant was guilty in the Catterini case, at least, of the act of corruption with which he was charged. But mere suspicion, even a strong one, is not enough to warrant a positive finding of guilt, and I find that, in spite of the *637 strength of the circumstance to which Justice Lawlor adverts, the dismissal by the defendant of the charge against Catterini in the face of the direct evidence against him presented to the defendant, I have not that certainty of conviction which would justify me in affirmatively finding the defendant guilty of corruption. Though this is my final conclusion, I feel free to voice my suspicion of the defendant in view of the wholly inexcusable…