Sword

On April 29, 1931, the plaintiff procured an interlocutory decree of divorce from the defendant on the ground of extreme cruelty. A property settlement agreement, theretofore entered into by the parties, was expressly referred to and approved in the decree, which decree has since become final. On October 1, 1932, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion to stay the entry of the final decree on the grounds that the interlocutory decree had been procured by fraud and undue influence and that the parties had become reconciled and had cohabited shortly after the entry of such interlocutory decree. Thereafter, and in fairly rapid succession, plaintiff also filed three other notices of motion, one to set aside the property settlement agreement on the ground that it had been procured by fraud and while plaintiff was sick and without independent counsel to advise *268 her; another to require the defendant, under the provisions of section 139 of the Civil Code, to make suitable allowance for her support because of her asserted destitution and her failure to ask for alimony at the time of the entry of the interlocutory decree, this omission being charged to her then attorney who, she claims,…