Petitioner seeks annulment of an order of the Industrial Accident Commission denying him compensation.

Viewing the evidence most favorable to respondents it appears that petitioner, Joseph H. Smith, was employed as an unskilled laborer by the Golden Gate International Exposition on April 8, 1940, at Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay. His duties consisted of performing labor on various portions of the roads on Treasure Island, he being required to work in various places from time to time. He resided in San Francisco and traveled to and from the island by ferry boats not operated or controlled by his employer; his employer did, however, pay for his transportation. The entire island comprising several hundred acres, including the system of roads thereon, was under the control of the employer, the latter being engaged in conducting an exposition or fair thereon. The roads on the island were designed and being used for the accommodation of the public attending the exposition, employees of the Golden Gate International Exposition, persons connected with concessions, etc. The employees were required to check out at the end of each day’s work at the employer’s administration office situated on the northeast portion of the island. The terminal of the ferry boats used by petitioner to return to his home in -San Francisco was on the west side of the island, more than one-half mile from the administration office. Generally one going from the administration building to the terminal would travel south on one of the north-south roads to its intersection with an east-west road, thence westerly *846 on the latter to the terminal. In order for the various crews of employees hired by the employer to travel about from one part of the island to the other to get from one assignment of work to another during the working day each crew was provided by the employer with a truck which was driven by the foreman of the crew. These trucks were not supplied by the employer for the purpose of carrying laborers from the administration building to the ferry terminal. On the day in question the petitioner, after his day’s work, checked out at the administration office and started for the ferry terminal on the north-south road. When he was in the road in front of the office he saw.a crew truck traveling in a southerly direction. The truck was one assigned to a carpenter crew and was being operated by the foreman thereof. Several employees were riding in the truck. He boarded the truck while it was in motion without the knowledge or express consent of the driver. When the truck reached the east-west road intersection it turned east, the direction opposite to the terminal which was petitioner’s destination and he jumped from the truck while it was in motion and in so doing suffered the injuries for which he sought compensation. Up to the time of the injury petitioner was traveling the most direct route to the terminal. The employer had not issued any orders prohibiting the employees from riding on the trucks to or part way to the terminal. It was the practice of employees to ride in said trucks either all or part of the way.

With the facts being as above stated, the respondent commission found that “Said injury did not arise out of nor occur in the course of the employment, nor while performing any service incidental thereto.” It is respondents’ position that the application of the going and coming rule prevents an award of compensation to petitioner. We cannot agree.

It may be observed with reference to petitioner’s riding upon the employer’s truck, that it is the general rule that when transportation is furnished by the employer to convey a workman to and from his place of work, as an incident of the employment, and the means of transportation are under the control of the employer, an injury sustained during such transportation arises in the course of employment and is compensable. (Harlan v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 352 [ 228 Pac. 654 ]; Dellepiani v. Industrial *847 Acc. Com., 211 Cal. 430 [ 295 Pac. 826 ].) But the transportation furnished must be connected with the employment or as said in Trussless Roof Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 119 Cal. App. 91, 93 [ 6 Pac. (2d) 254 ] :

The rule is, that it is not necessary for an injury to be compensable that it occur before the employee shall have left the actual point where he has been working, and before he actually ceases to render service. Injuries sustained by an employee while going to or from his place of work upon premises owned or controlled by his employer are generally deemed to have arisen out of and in the *848 course of the employment and are thus compensable. (Makins v. Industrial Acc. Com., 198 Cal. 698 [ 247 Pac. 202 , 49 A. L. R 411]; Jimeson v. Industrial Acc. Com., 23 Cal. App. (2d) 634 [ 73 Pac. (2d) 1238 ]; Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 181 Cal. 300 [ 184 Pac. 1 ]; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154 [48 Sup. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507 ].) In the instant case the entire island and system of roads thereon were under the control of the employer and used by it in the conduct of the exposition. Petitioner’s duties took him to various parts of the island as the assignments of work demanded. He was injured while leaving the island and had not loitered thereon after having checked out at the administration office. He was leaving the premises by the most direct route and via the roads, the only means provided for egress therefrom. Under these circumstances we believe that petitioner was on his employer’s premises and leaving by the means provided therefor when the injury was sustained, and that it may be said that it was contemplated by the employer that he would still be in its employment until he embarked on the ferry boat to leave the island, the employer’s premises, which he did by the only and most reasonable route available. In Lynch v. City of New York, 242 N. Y. 115 [ 151 N. E. 149 ], the city of New York maintained a hospital and grounds on an island in East River. A nurse there employed was injured when walking on a sidewalk on the island while going to one of the public facilities to leave the island for New York City. The court of appeals in affirming an award of the State Industrial' Board stated:

Respondents make much of the fact that the roads on the island in the instant case were used by the public attending the exposition and employees of concessions thereon, as well as employees of the Golden Gate International Exposition. That factor is not decisive when it is remembered that the employment necessarily contemplated that the employees must leave the island to return home, that the roads were under the control of the employer, and that therefore, their employment necessarily required that they use the roads on the island; no other means were available. Traveling over those roads to reach the public transportation facilities for leaving the island together with the dan *850 gers attendant therewith was therefore incident to the employment. The island was and the roads thereon were controlled by the employer, and the court may take judicial notice that the only members of the public that could also use the roads were those willing and able to pay the admission charge made by the employer for entry on the island and to visit the exposition there conducted, or those given permission so to enter by the employer. Merely because the public by permission used the roads did not make them public highways. The island and its system of roads was not unlike a manufacturing plant. (Lynch v. City of New York, supra; see also: Wilson Berger Coal Co. v. Brown, 223 Ky. 183 [ 3 S. W. (2d) 199 ].) There is nothing in the case of London etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 173 Cal. 642 [ 161 Pac. 2 ], cited by respondents contrary to the views herein expressed. There the work had ended and there was no evidence that the leaving of the premises by the workman to return home was incidental to the employment. The general statement therein that the fact that the employee was still on the employer’s estate does not of itself make the injury compensable, is probably correct, but that does not mean that that factor considered with others will not make an injury compensable.

Respondents refer to authorities to the effect that an employee of a city engaged in street work in a certain part of the city, who receives injuries while going to or from his home on city streets cannot recover compensation. We are not here called upon to decide that question. From what we have heretofore said such a ease is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. (See also: Lynch v. City of New York, supra.)

It cannot be said that the fact that petitioner rode on the truck rather than walked bars his recovery on the ground that he stepped out of the course of his employment. This is true because the evidence showed that it was the custom of employees to obtain such rides and the employer had not given any orders prohibiting the practice. (See Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Com., 18 Cal. (2d) 40 [ 112 Pac. (2d) 615 ].) That petitioner boarded a moving truck and jumped from it while it was moving is not significant. It is nothing more than a charge of negligence on his part which is no defense in proceedings *851 for workmen's compensation. (California C. I. Ex. v. Industrial Accident Com., 5 Cal. (2d) 185 [ 53 Pac. (2d) 758 ]; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Industrial Accident Com., supra.)

The order is annulled.

Traynor, J., Moore, J., pro tem., and Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred.