Kay

“To thus interpret law doth cuckold justice.” The “dim and odious annals of the past” (Lytton Strachey, Elizabeth and Essex) are, indeed, come down to date. Is an adult man who is sane and competent in fact, who has served his country as well as his community as a physician and surgeon, who is convicted of no crime, who owes no debts, who has thousands of dollars of cash in the hands of a bank which had been appointed his guardian, who owns a house which he built on a lot which he bought with funds which he earned, who is possessed of ample income, who needs and wishes to keep the house to use as an office for his practice and as a home for himself and his two young daughters, but who at one time was mentally ill for *229 67 days, who, it is res judicata, had recovered and was “sane and competent” at the time of the court order here involved, helpless to prevent a sale by his “guardian” of his property? To the shame of our system of jurisprudence the majority of this court so hold.

Dr. Willard E. Kay, a physician and surgeon, the husband of Nancy Kay and the father of Nancy Ann and Kathryn, who has honorably ministered in the armed forces as well as in his civilian community,…

In this certiorari proceeding, petitioner seeks annulment of an order of the probate court confirming the sale of his home property. The sale was made while pe *217 titioner was incompetent, but he has been restored to capacity since the order of confirmation of sale. Before his commitment he used the property both as a home and as an office where he practiced as a physician.

Petitioner’s guardian sold the property under the authority of section 1530 of the Probate Code: “If ... it is for the advantage, benefit, and best interests of the estate or ward or of such members of his family as he is legally bound to support and maintain, his guardian may sell any of his real or personal property for any of such purposes, subject to authorization, confirmation or direction by the court as hereinafter provided.”

A guardian’s sale is not effective, however, until it is confirmed by the court. (Kier Corp. v. Treasure Oil Co., 57 Cal.App.2d 829, 842 [ 136 P.2d 59 ].) Probate Code, section 785 (see Prob. Code, § 1534) provides that “Upon hearing the court must examine into the necessity for the sale, or the advantage, benefit and interest of the estate in having the sale made, and must…

I concur in the judgment of affirmance, and I am in full accord with the views expressed in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Traynor.

In view of the showing made in the trial court I cannot see how it can possibly be said that the trial judge did not have sufficient evidence before him to justify his conclusion that the sale in question was for the best interests of the incompetent ward in this case. It is not the function of an appellate court to weigh the evidence or to pass upon the reasonableness of conflicting inferences which may be drawn from the evidence even if that evidence is undisputed. Under our system of jurisprudence the weighing of the evidence and the determination of the effect of the inferences to be drawn therefrom is solely for the trier of fact (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [ 143 P.2d 689 ] ; Eagles v. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 [ 67 S.Ct. 313 , 91 L.Ed. ---] ; Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29 [ 64 S.Ct. 409 , 88 L.Ed. 520 ]; Ellis v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 329 U.S. 649 [ 67 S.Ct. 598 , 91 L.Ed.---]; National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 [ 64 S.Ct. 851 , 88 L.Ed. 1170 ] ; Commissioner v. Scottish Amer. Co., 323 U.S.…