Brotsky

Brotsky v. State Bar

Good Law
19 Cal. Rptr. 153·1962 Cal. LEXIS 173·57 Cal. 2d 287·368 P.2d 697·94 A.L.R. 2d 1310
Supreme Court of CaliforniaFebruary 15, 1962S. F. No. 20751California6,359 words

Opinion

lead Opinion

Allan Brotsky, a member of the State Bar of California and the petitioner herein, brought this proceeding to review certain actions of the Board of Governors and certain interim orders of one of its San Francisco local administrative committees. All of these actions and orders were a portion of State Bar disciplinary proceeding No. S. F. 1881 now pending before the local committee, in which petitioner is respondent.

The two principal questions involved are:

*292 If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, then other questions arise in regard to the nature and extent of the available vehicles of discovery.

The background of the case is as follows:

Brotsky answered, admitting the terms of the retainer agreement as set forth in the notice to show cause, but asserted that neither that agreement nor his activities thereunder constituted willful solicitation of employment, acceptance of solicited employment, or aiding or abetting an unlicensed organization to practice law. He also urged that, by reason of the statutory exemption of attorneys for insurance companies, and the further fact that the State Bar has authorized or condoned similar practices by the attorneys for…

dissent Opinion

Schauer, J.

The majority opinion, at the outset, has phrased its definition of the “two principal questions involved”; i.e.:

I find it unnecessary, and as a matter of judicial policy undesirable, to undertake at this stage of the proceedings to spell out all the definitive answers within the broad scope of the majority’s questions.

My approach to the problem starts on a plateau of recognition that (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6001) “The State Bar of California is a public corporation . . . [endowed with the power to] do all . . . acts . . . necessary or expedient for the administration of its affairs and the attainment of its purposes [and that]

“No law of this State restricting, or prescribing a mode of procedure for the exercise of powers of state public bodies or state agencies . . . shall be applicable to the State Bar, unless the Legislature expressly so declares.” Thus the state has formally recognized that the State Bar is a public corporation sui generis.

I do not find that article III, chapter III, title III, part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure (Depositions and Discovery, added by Stats. 1957, eh. 1904, p. 3322) has been expressly declared by the Legislature to be applicable to…

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