Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction of forgery.

Facts: August 13, 1956, defendant entered a plea of guilty to forgery (violation of Pen. Code, § 470) and filed an appliea *476 tion for probation. August 28, 1956, the date set for judgment and/or probation hearing, defendant appeared with his attorney and was ordered to serve six months in the county jail, with the last three months suspended during three years of probation. 1

April 13, 1962, defendant appeared with counsel before the trial court on a probation hearing, after which the court made an order revoking defendant’s probation and arraigned him for judgment on the original charge to which he had pleaded guilty in 1956. Thereafter the court rendered judgment and sentenced defendant to confinement in the state prison for the term prescribed by law (one to fourteen years), with a recommendation that he serve more than the minimum sentence.

Defendant contends that the action taken by the trial court on August 28, 1956, constituted rendition of a final judgment of conviction and the imposition of sentence therefor, and that the court had no jurisdiction to render judgment and pronounce sentence against him on April 13, 1962, on his plea of guilty entered August 13, 1956.

This contention is correct. In granting probation after a conviction, the trial court may suspend the imposition of sentence, in which ease no judgment of conviction is rendered, or it may impose sentence and order the execution thereof stayed. In the latter case a judgment of conviction has been rendered. (In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 58 [1] [ 109 P.2d 344 , 132 A.L.R. 644 ].)

The following documents show that a judgment was rendered and sentence imposed against defendant on August 28,1956 :

The page concludes with a certification by the deputy clerk wherein he states that the “foregoing” is “a full, true and correct copy of the judgment duly made and entered in the Minutes of” the court; that he had compared the same with the original; and that the same is a transcript therefrom and the whole thereof.

The document omits all mention of suspension of imposition of sentence and fails to mention probation in any manner. It is clear, however, from the reporter’s transcript that the court granted probation. Therefore, the reference to suspension of three months of the six-months sentence must be deemed a reference to probation in connection with a final sentence already pronounced. (Cf. In re Herron, 217 Cal. 400, 404 [2] [ 19 P.2d 4 ]; People v. Rickson, 112 Cal.App.2d 475, 481 [10] [ 246 P.2d 700 ] ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Justice Court, 99 Cal.App.2d 683, 687 [ 222 P.2d 292 ] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court].)

Since it is clear that judgment was rendered and sentence imposed upon defendant on August 28, 1956, the court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment and pronounce sentence against him on April 13, 1962, on his plea of guilty entered August 13, 1956. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2; In re Loros, 48 Cal.App.2d 680, 681 [ 120 P.2d 69 ].)

In view of our conclusions, it is unnecessary to discuss other points raised by defendant.

The judgment is reversed.

Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.

At further probation hearings held April 23, 1958, and June 6, 1960, the period of probation was purportedly extended for a total of an additional nine years.