Latipac, Inc. v. Superior Court of Marin County

Latipac, Incorporated (hereinafter defendant) petitions for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent superior court from taking any further proceedings in an action on contract brought by the real party in interest, J. W. Lee & Co. (hereinafter plaintiff).

In this case defendant seeks to avoid its contractual obligation to plaintiff by reason of plaintiff’s failure strictly to comply with the statutory provisions which govern the licensing of contractors. The statute in question, section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code, denies to unlicensed contractors the use of the courts for the recovery of sums owed to them for contracting services. 1 In view of the severity of *280 this sanction and of the forfeitures which it necessarily entails, our decisions record our reluctance to construe the statute more broadly than requisite to the achievement of its manifest purpose. We have not insisted on literal compliance in the situation in which the party seeking to escape his obligation has received the full protection which the statute contemplates. Examination of the facts of the present case discloses that it falls within the ambit of the doctrine of “substantial…

I dissent.

In this case a contractor seeks to recover the balance due on a construction contract for work performed in part while lacking a valid license required by the Contractors License Law. (Bus. & Prof. Code, div. 3, ch. 9.) Such an action is barred as a matter of law by Business and Professions Code section 7031. 1 The contractor, moreover, cannot bring his claim within that small group of exceptions developed by the courts in cases in which at least one licensee was on the job at all times.

Although making passing reference to “fidelity to precedent,” the majority opinion emphasizes “considerations of equity” which are said to “preclude us from requiring the wholly gratuitous enrichment of defendant at the expense of plaintiff and its creditors. We are not disposed to decree vast forfeitures in the aid of no ascertainable public policy.” But even if such matters were meritorious—which petitioner has denied—they may not be considered in an action barred by the express terms of section 7031. 2 As we explained in Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d 141, 150-151 [ 308 P.2d 713 ], “One answer to this contention is that, even in the absence of a provision such as…