People v. Jackson

A judgment convicting defendant of first degree murder and sentencing him to death was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 375 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 379 P.2d 937 ].) Thereafter, because of errors condemned in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ], we issued a writ of habeas corpus and reversed the judgment insofar as it related to penalty. (In re Jackson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 500 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 220 , 393 P.2d 420 ].) Upon retrial, defendant waived a jury trial, and the court fixed the penalty at death. This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)

*98 The essential facts are set forth in our former opinion and need not be repeated. (People v. Jackson, supra, 59 Cal.2d 375 .)

By stipulation the evidence at the penalty retrial consisted of the transcripts of the trial on the issue of guilt and the first trial on the issue of penalty, subject to objections and further testimony. The trial court assumed that Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], applied and deleted from the transcript all of defendant's extrajudicial admissions and all questions and answers of…

I dissent. I would affirm the judgment imposing the death penalty.

Concurring and dissenting.

I agree with the majority insofar as they reverse the judg *101 ment imposing the death penalty. I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that refuses to consider the impact of the errors on the issue of guilt.

This case has been before us several times. On April 2, 1963, we affirmed the first degree murder judgment, imposing the death penalty (People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 379 P.2d 937 ]). Thereafter, on July 6, 1964, on habeas corpus, a new penalty trial was ordered because of errors condemned in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ], The judgment was affirmed in all other respects (In re Jackson, 61 Cal.2d 500 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 220 , 393 P.2d 420 ]). At the new penalty trial, a jury was waived, and again the death penalty was imposed. The present appeal is from that judgment and is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)

The appellant contends that at both the original guilt trial and at the retrial of the penalty issue there were admitted into evidence admissions and a confession in violation of the rules established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d…