In re Hayes

On December 30, 1966, petitioner David Oliver Hayes drove a motor vehicle for some 13 blocks in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601 (with knowledge of a suspended license) and Vehicle Code section 23102 (while under the influence of intoxicating liquor). He pleaded guilty to and was sentenced for both offenses. Petitioner now asserts that imposition of sentences for both violations is contrary to the proscription against multiple punishment contained in Penal Code section 654. We have concluded that petitioner’s contention lacks merit.

Section 654 provides that “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be .punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one. . . .” The interdiction is not limited to the provisions of the Penal Code, but embraces penal provisions in other codes as well, including those found in the Vehicle Code. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11 , 18 fn. 1 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ]; People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711 [ 204 P.2d 321 ].)

The key to application of section 654 is in the phrase ‘1 act or omission ”: a defendant may be…

I dissent.

Section 654 of the Penal Code provides that “An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one.” Underlying this deceptively simple language is a legislative determination that essentially unitary criminal activity shall not be punished more than once regardless of how many distinct crimes it may comprise. The statute “has been applied not only where there was but one ‘act’ in the ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section 654.” (People v. Brown (1958) 49 Cal.2d 577, 591 [ 320 P.2d 5 ].) Since its application is not limited to cases in which the identical conduct violates two statutes or one offense is necessarily included in the other 1 (Neal v. State of California *612 (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 18 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ], and cases cited), the words an “act . . . made punishable ... by different provisions ’ ’ do not refer…