Damico

In Moffat v. Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 877 , 612 P.2d 967 ], we held that a parent under a court order to pay support for a minor child must pay that support even if the parent with custody interferes with the paying parent’s right to visit with the child. We are now asked to decide whether a custodial parent who not merely interferes with visitation rights, but actively conceals the parent and child from the other parent until the child becomes an adult may thereafter seek arrearages for child support obligations accrued during the period of concealment. The Courts of Appeal are divided on the question to what extent, if any, concealment is a defense to the obligation to pay child support.

Concealment of the child and the custodial parent from the noncustodial parent until the child reaches the age of majority is different from mere *676 interference with visitation both in degree and in kind. As a difference in degree, it obliterates the entire relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. This alone may not be sufficient to warrant a different rule than that of Moffat v. Moffat, supra, 27 Cal.3d 645 . As a difference in kind, however,…

The majority opinion ignores a significant portion of the procedural history of this case. When the full history is examined, we find that the present action is not one to determine child support arrearages, but an action to establish and enforce a previous judgment that has long since become final. To successfully resist enforcement of this final judgment, Ronald Damico (father) must establish not only that he has a valid defense on the merits, but also that there are equitable grounds to set aside the final judgment, and that he has acted with diligence in seeking relief.

The record shows that Mary Damico Austin (mother) obtained an order and judgment for child support in 1960. In 1978, mother commenced proceedings to collect past due installments of child support by personally serving father with a notice that she was seeking arrearages for the years 1960 to 1978. In June 1980, after father had failed to appear at a hearing on mother’s application, the superior court granted judgment against father for over $23,000. In April 1990, mother renewed this judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 683.110 et seq.) With accrued interest, the judgment amount upon renewal was over $34,000. All…

I respectfully dissent.

The majority sanction disobedience of court orders and ignore the limited scope of a proceeding brought under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). The holding encourages parents who are subject to child support orders to become scofflaws. It threatens disruption of existing national uniform procedures by which child support orders are enforced. Moreover, it ignores the Legislature’s express limitation on the power of a court to relieve a parent from an obligation to pay arrearages.

The result is all the more unfortunate because it is completely unnecessary. The question of whether an estoppel against an action for arrearages should be recognized arises only because the nonsupporting parent failed to avail himself or herself of readily available procedures whereby he or she could be relieved judicially of the support obligation if, in fact, the child has been concealed by the custodial parent.

The majority acknowledge, but apparently find little significance in them for this case, the services available to a parent who believes a child is being concealed. If those services have been used, however, and the whereabouts *691 of…