M.S.

This case requires us to address various constitutional challenges to Penal Code sections 422.6 and 422.7, two of California’s “hate crime” statutes. 1 The juvenile court found that M.S. and A.G., the minors, violated section 422.6 by their actions in the course of a melee early one morning in the Castro District of San Francisco and further found true *707 allegations under section 422.7. The Court of Appeal rejected the minors’ challenges to the constitutionality of sections 422.6 and 422.7. We likewise conclude the statutes are constitutionally valid.

Facts

The incident giving rise to this case was the subject of conflicting testimony. Members of each side of the fracas testified it stemmed from the other’s verbal provocations; each portrayed the other as the aggressor. As an appellate court, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 ].)

On August 20, 1990, around 2:30 a.m., Jonathan Ebarb, Christopher Minor, Bill Camilo, Dennis Graff and Christopher McMillen were riding in Ebarb’s flatbed truck to Little Orphan Andy’s, a restaurant on 17th Street near Castro Street…

I concur in the judgment. The majority’s disposition is correct, and I join in it. But I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of Penal Code sections 422.6 and 422.7 (all statutory references are to this code).

I.

The majority have misconstrued the intent requirement of section 422.6 in a manner that will make prosecuting hate crimes more difficult.

Section 422.6 provides, “No person . . . shall by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate, interfere with, oppress, or threaten any . . . person” exercising his or her personal liberties “because of the other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation, or because he or she perceives that the other person has one or more of those characteristics.” (Id., subd. (a).) With regard to acts consisting purely of speech—i.e., threats—a showing is required that “the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person or group of persons and ... the defendant had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (Id., subd. (c).)

In other words, section 422.6 does no more than punish threats of violence, assaults or batteries made or committed for a particularly…

I concur in the majority opinion and in the judgment. I write separately to state my understanding of one part of our decision in this case: the construction of the words “because of’ as they are used in Penal Code sections 422.6 and 422.7.

Penal Code section 422.6 defines a criminal offense. At the time of the conduct at issue here, the offense was defined as using force or the threat of *730 force to injure, intimidate or interfere with, oppress, or threaten another person in the exercise of that person’s civil rights “because of the other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation." (Italics added.) Penal Code section 422.7 is a penalty enhancement provision. At the time relevant here, it increased the punishment for a misdemeanor if it was committed against the person or property of another for the purpose of interfering with the other person’s exercise of civil rights “because of the other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or sexual orientation . . . .” (Italics added.) Thus, an element common to these two “hate crime” provisions is that the defendant have acted “because of’ the victim’s statutorily enumerated…