Franklin

Franklin v. State Bar of California

Good Law
1986 Cal. LEXIS 170·224 Cal. Rptr. 738·41 Cal. 3d 700·715 P.2d 699
Supreme Court of CaliforniaApril 7, 1986L.A. No. 32094California3,654 words

Opinion

lead Opinion

This is a proceeding to review the findings and recommendations of the State Bar concerning petitioner, Floyd Franklin.

The hearing panel recommended that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for five years, that execution of the suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation for five years. As a condition of probation, the hearing panel recommended that petitioner be required to notify his clients that he is on probation. The review department, by a vote of eight to three, recommended that petitioner be suspended for only one year, that execution of the suspension be stayed, and that petitioner be placed on probation for one year.

This court notified petitioner that it was considering imposing more severe discipline than that recommended by the State Bar. Specifically, petitioner was informed that three months of actual suspension and nine months of stayed suspension might be imposed. Petitioner argues that no period of actual suspension is required to protect the public.

I.

Both the hearing panel and the review department found petitioner guilty of misconduct in his handling of two cases. The review department agreed with the hearing panel’s…

dissent Opinion

Lucas, J.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, more severe discipline is warranted here.

Petitioner was admitted to the bar in 1972; his misconduct, spanning the period from 1977-1983, includes: (1) failure to communicate with the Evanses after repeated inquiries by them; (2) failure to answer interrogatories, produce documents, or inform one client of her scheduled deposition, or even apprise this client of these omissions, which eventually led to dismissal of her case; (3) failure to advise the client of the dismissal of her case; and (4) failure to cooperate with newly appointed counsel. Additionally, petitioner intentionally misled the State Bar hearing panel inquiring into these acts of misconduct.

The majority concludes that petitioner’s misconduct “did not involve minor, technical deviations from the Rules of Professional Conduct. They constituted basic violations of petitioner’s oath and duties as an attorney” {ante, p. 710), yet the majority imposes a mere one-year stayed suspension, and a one-year probation, with only 45 days’ actual suspension from the practice of law. I disagree that a mere six-week suspension for conduct constituting “basic violations of petitioner’s oath and…

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