Lungren

I concur in the judgment. Before this court granted a rehearing in this matter, I authored a dissenting opinion setting forth my views, which have not changed and which are in substantial agreement with the reasoning of the plurality opinion. Because that dissenting opinion no longer appears in the Official Reports (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 976(d)), I reiterate that opinion here in relevant part, with additions in brackets and deletions reflected as [].

California’s parental consent law, which prohibits abortions for women under the age of 18 years without either the consent of one parent or judicial authorization, may at first glance appear so eminently reasonable that its constitutional validity could scarcely be in doubt. But evidence received at the trial of this case, much of it based on the experience of other states with similar laws, shows that the benevolent appearance of parental involvement laws is deceiving; the laws have serious adverse effects and yield few benefits for children or society.

In brief, the relevant facts are these: Most adolescent women who become pregnant will consult a parent voluntarily, and those who do not frequently have good reasons for…

In this case we must determine the validity, under the California Constitution, of a statutory provision that requires a pregnant minor (whether just short of her 18th birthday, or several years younger) to secure parental consent or judicial authorization before she may obtain an abortion. The trial court, after a lengthy court trial, concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed with that ruling and affirmed the judgment.

As in past cases involving the controversial subject of abortion, we emphasize at the outset that the morality of abortion is not at issue in this case. “The morality of abortion is not a legal or constitutional issue; it is a matter of philosophy, of ethics, and of theology. It is a subject upon which reasonable people can, and do, adhere to vastly divergent convictions and principles.” (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 *314 Cal.3d 252, 284 [ 172 Cal.Rptr. 866 , 625 P.2d 779 , 20 A.L.R.4th 1118 ].) Our decision in this case does not turn upon the personal views of any justice with regard to that moral issue.

Nor is the desirability of parental involvement in a minor’s decision…

I dissent.

The plurality hold that Assembly Bill No. 2274, which prohibits unemancipated minors—including girls as young as nine years old—from obtaining abortions without either consent by a parent or a legal guardian or authorization by a neutral juvenile court judge, violates article I, sections 1 and 7 of the California Constitution. As I shall explain, I strongly disagree. Setting aside any personal beliefs concerning the morality—and politics—of abortion, I conclude the law is valid and should not be enjoined. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I.

Enacted by the Legislature in 1987 (Stats. 1987, ch. 1237, §§ 2, 3), Assembly Bill No. 2274 amends former Civil Code section 34.5 (now Family Code section 6925) to exclude abortion from the medical procedures for which an unemancipated minor may give consent “[without] disaffirmance because of minority.” (Fam. Code, § 6921.) It also added former section 25958 to the Health and Safety Code (now Health & Saf. Code, § 123450, in subd. (a)) providing that “[except in a medical emergency requiring immediate medical action, no abortion shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor unless she first has…

I respectfully dissent.

Missing from the plurality and concurring opinions (hereafter majority) is a concise and accurate description of the change in California law occasioned by Assembly Bill No. 2274. This statute simply shifts the ultimate responsibility of determining whether a child is sufficiently mature to give informed consent to an abortion from the abortion provider to a neutral judge when a parent of the child has not consented to the abortion. Moreover, even when the judge concludes that a child is incapable of giving informed consent, an abortion may be ordered if the judge concludes it is in the child’s best interest. Assembly Bill No. 2274 represents the collective judgment of the Legislature, patterned after numerous precedents of the United States Supreme Court, that this shift of responsibility is in the best interests of pregnant children and their parents.

The plurality opinion asserts that this shift of responsibility violates the California Constitution because the requirement that a court determine competence when a child seeks an abortion unless a parent has consented to the procedure impermissibly intrudes on the child’s autonomy privacy. The opinion…

I. Introduction

Today, the court invalidates the Legislature’s effort to increase the involvement of parents in the abortion decisions of their unemancipated minor daughters, concluding the enactment cannot survive the exacting scrutiny of a compelling state interest test. To reach this result, the plurality must ignore the historic limits of the federal Constitution, rewrite the privacy provision of the state Constitution, and abrogate the constitutional interests of parents in an opinion that cannot survive any level of scrutiny, much less strict scrutiny.

In 1987, our Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 2274, 1987-1988 Regular Session (hereafter Assembly Bill 2274), which prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on an unemancipated minor without either the written consent of one of her parents or judicial authorization. Assembly Bill 2274 embodies a legislative effort to accommodate the competing interests *419 involved in an unemancipated minor’s abortion decision—the minor’s interests, the interests of her parents, and the state’s interest in her health and welfare. As this court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly cautioned, when dealing with the…