Bickel

In 1977, the Legislature enacted the Permit Streamlining Act. (Gov. Code, § 65920 et seq.; all statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.) The act, as relevant here, has certain time limits within which a government agency must either approve or disapprove an application for a development project. (§ 65950 et seq.) Failure to act within these time limits “shall be deemed approval of the permit application for the development project.” (§ 65956, subd. (b).)

Does the act prohibit an applicant’s waiver of the time limits? We conclude that it does not and that in this case substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of waiver by plaintiff applicants.

*1044 I.

On March 7, 1991, plaintiffs Branden Bickel and Claudia Cate applied to the City of Piedmont Planning Commission (Planning Commission) for approval of a proposed 2,739-square-foot second story addition to their ranch-style home. The commission assigned No. 44-91 to the application, and scheduled a public hearing for April 8,1991. After plaintiffs learned that some of their neighbors had expressed concerns about the proposed addition, plaintiffs asked the commission to take…

I respectfully dissent. In language too plain for debate, the Permit Streamlining Act (Gov. Code, § 65920 et seq.; Act) 1 specifies that a public agency must approve or disapprove a permit application on its merits within the time limits set forth in the statute, and if the agency fails to do so, the application is “deemed approved.” The Act expressly permits one, and only one, 90-day extension of the initial time limits by mutual consent. In this case, the deadline for final approval or disapproval, as once extended by mutual consent, was January 12,1993, at the latest. However, the application was not formally denied until February 8,1993. By the Act’s express terms, the denial was therefore ineffectual, and the application must be “deemed approved.” A majority of the Court of Appeal so concluded, and we should therefore affirm its judgment.

But a majority of this court refuse to do so. Instead, they hold that the applicant may unilaterally “waive” the statutory limit at will, and that a valid waiver occurred here. I cannot agree. At numerous points, and in consistent fashion, the Act makes clear that its time limits are strict and without exception, and that evasive tactics…