Lippel

Lippel v. San Francisco

Good Law
1990 Cal. LEXIS 5468·276 Cal. Rptr. 290·51 Cal. 3d 1160·90 Daily Journal DAR 14274·801 P.2d 1041
Supreme Court of CaliforniaDecember 17, 1990No. S013741California5,276 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Panelli, J.

In this action we are asked to decide whether it is a denial of due process, as embodied in Code of Civil Procedure section 580 (section 580), to enter a default judgment ordering a husband to pay child support, where the wife’s petition for marital dissolution, which was served on the husband, did not request child support and no notice of any such request was ever served on the husband. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that such a default judgment is void for lack of notice and therefore subject to collateral attack by the husband.

I.

Facts and Proceedings Below

In March 1971 Ronald Lippel’s wife, Angela Lippel (Angela), filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage of 11 Vi months, requesting custody of their infant daughter, Kristin. Angela initiated the action by filing a standard printed form petition, which was statutorily authorized, that provided blank spaces for the entry of certain statistical information and contained boxes to be checked to indicate what relief was being requested by the petitioner. (Civ. Code, § 4503.)

Angela checked the boxes that indicated there was no property to be divided and that she was not requesting spousal support.…

Dissenting Opinion

Mosk, J.

I dissent.

I would pose the question in this case somewhat differently: may a father avoid his statutory duty to support his child throughout her minority merely because the mother neglected in divorce proceedings to specifically petition the court to make an award of child support? I would answer that question in the negative.

Since 1971, when these parents dissolved their marriage, the father has contributed nothing for the support of his child. As a result, the taxpayers paid for that support. It would appear equitable, indeed compelling, for the father to repay that sum to the taxpayers.

The defenses of the father are not persuasive, either legally or morally. First, he claims he bought his daughter some clothes on occasion, a stereo, and some dancing lessons. That was considerate but hardly generous, and it did not compensate for his failure to provide the necessities of life for nearly 17 years. Where did he believe the mother was obtaining the resources to put the child’s food on the table? Since he claims to have maintained “a close relationship with his daughter through regular visits,” he cannot have been unaware that the mother was compelled to rely on a public…

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