Newman

I concur in the judgment and the majority’s reasoning with the exception of footnote 4. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 442, fn. 4.) It necessarily follows both from this court’s reasoning in People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 , 862 P.2d 831 ], as well as the majority’s reasoning today, that a defendant who stipulates to every element of a charged offense or enhancement must be advised of and waive his or her rights in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ] and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]. Because the majority, in footnote 4, plants a seed of doubt as to this issue when no doubt previously existed, I cannot join it.

With that exception, I concur in the majority opinion.

Mosk, J., concurred.

*415 Opinion

This case presents the question whether, in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)), a defendant must be advised of and waive certain rights set forth in Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ], In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ], and In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 ] (hereafter frequently referred to as Boykin-Tahl advisements) prior to stipulating to his or her status as a felon. 1 The issue has spawned conflicting pronouncements from this court (compare People v. Adams (1993) 6 Cal.4th 570, 581 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 831 , 862 P.2d 831 ] (Adams), and People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ] (Hall)) and from the Courts of Appeal (compare People v. Robertson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 835, 840-842 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 572 ] (Robertson), People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 658, 670-671 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 614 ] (Turner), disapproved on another point in People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 411 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 , 956 P.2d 1137 ], and People v. Fisk (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 364, 371 [ 123…