Bledsoe

We review the recommendation of the State Bar that petitioner James Bledsoe III be disbarred from the practice of law. The *1076 recommendation is based on findings of professional misconduct in four matters. After considering the record and the arguments of petitioner and the State Bar, we conclude the recommended discipline is too severe. We therefore suspend petitioner from the practice of law for five years, stay his suspension, and place him on probation for five years on conditions including actual suspension for two years and restitution to his clients.

I. Facts and Proceedings Before the State Bar Court

Petitioner was admitted to the practice of law in this state on June 2, 1972. He has no record of prior discipline.

On October 17, 1988, the Office of Trial Counsel of the State Bar (Office) served on petitioner 1 a notice to show cause charging him with five counts of professional misconduct. The notice advised him that a default could be entered if he failed to file a written answer to the notice within 20 days. The notice also advised him that an entry of default could result in an admission of the charged misconduct and constitute a bar to further…

I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no pattern of misconduct, or with its statement that petitioner was “doubly penalized for not attending a hearing of which he was not given notice.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1080.)

A. Pattern of Abandonment

The habitual disregard of clients’ interests constitutes moral turpitude that warrants disbarment. (Stanley v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 555, 566 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 183 , 788 P.2d 697 ].) The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide, “Culpability of a member of a pattern of wilfully failing to perform services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the causes in which he or she was retained shall result in disbarment.” (Std. 2.4(a), Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct (Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V) [hereafter standards].) The majority acknowledges the foregoing, yet because “petitioner’s misconduct involved four clients in seventeen years of practice,” it “find[s] no extended ‘pattern’ of wilfully failing to perform services.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1080.) If the majority accurately characterized this case as involving four acts of misconduct spread…