Atkins

I concur in the result.

I join in the majority’s conclusion that evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to disprove the mental state required for the crime of arson. But I cannot join in the analysis that they present in support.

The admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication to disprove the mental state required for a crime does not depend, ultimately, on relevance. Such evidence has a tendency in reason, either greater or lesser, to disprove any mental state. (See Evid. Code, § 210.) Some mental state, if only consciousness, is required for every crime, even one termed a “strict liability” offense. (See Pen. Code, § 26, par. Four.)

Rather, the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication to disprove the mental state required for a crime depends, ultimately, on policy— specifically, as we explained in People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444 [ 82 *94 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ], the policy of the Legislature, implicit in section 22 of the Penal Code, to “achieve” a “humane, but workable,” “compromise between the conflicting feelings of sympathy and reprobation for the intoxicated offender” (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 456 ).

In implementing…

I concur in the determination that arson is a general intent crime precluding a defense of voluntary intoxication. I write separately because I remain convinced People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P.2d 735 ] (Mendoza) was wrongly decided (see id. at pp. 1138-1141 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.)) and, as this case illustrates, will continue to wreak havoc in the lower courts for years to come.

In finding arson to be a specific intent crime, the Court of Appeal initially cited its own decisions in In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1054 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 578 ] and People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667 ]; but it substantially bolstered this conclusion by drawing heavily on Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pages 1126-1132, as well as People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 , 868 P.2d 272 ]—on which the Mendoza court principally relied—and People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ]—which it cited with approval. The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that “although knowledge ‘may not fall…

Is evidence of voluntary intoxication admissible, under Penal Code section 22, on the issue of whether defendant formed the required mental state for arson (Pen. Code, § 451)? 1 We conclude that such evidence is not admissible because arson is a general intent crime. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

On September 26, 1997, defendant told his friends that he hated Orville Figgs and was going to bum down Figgs’s house.

On the afternoon of September 27, defendant and his brother David drove by Figgs’s home on the Ponderosa Sky Ranch. Defendant “flipped the bird” at Figgs as they passed by.

Later that day, around 5:00 p.m., a neighbor saw David drive a white pickup truck into the Ponderosa Sky Ranch canyon, but could not tell if he had a passenger. Around 9:00 p.m., the same neighbor saw the pickup track drive out of the canyon at a high rate of speed. A half-hour later, a fire was reported. Shortly after 10:00 p.m., Figgs was awakened by a neighbor. Because the fire was rapidly approaching his house, Figgs set up a fire line. The fire came within 150 feet of his house.

At 9:00 or 9:30 p.m., one of defendant’s…