Anderson

I concur in the opinion of the court.

It has long been my position that we should vacate a sentence of death imposed on a criminal defendant as unreliable, in violation of both the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and also the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of whatever evidence was available. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ] (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn. 1 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 892 P.2d 1287 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 835 [ 38…

*559 Opinion

In 1979, defendant was convicted of two counts each of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189), 1 kidnapping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209), and robbery (§ 211) arising from a single incident in March 1979. As to each murder, the special circumstances of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and robbery murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) were found true. The jury sentenced defendant to death. In 1987, we affirmed the guilt judgment, struck one of the multiple-murder special circumstances, and reversed the penalty judgment for so-called Ramos error (People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 689 P.2d 430 ] [improper Briggs instruction on Governor’s commutation power]). (People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ] (Anderson I).)

In December 1990 and January 1991, defendant was retried on the issue of penalty. Again he was sentenced to death. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

We find no reversible error. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Facts

The People proffered evidence of (1) the 1979 robbery murders of Donna Coselman and Louise Flanagan, which led to defendant’s capital convictions, and…

I concur in the majority’s affirmance of defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. I write separately because I think *608 a bit more should be said about defendant’s contention that the trial court erred when it barred him from cross-examining prosecution witness Deborah Baros about her past treatment for mental illness. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 578-579.)

The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees the defendant in a criminal prosecution the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In almost identical words, the California Constitution, in section 15 of article I, also secures the right of confrontation. The primary interest protected by the confrontation guarantee is the right of cross-examination, which is “the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 316 [ 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 ].) Because cross-examination implements the constitutional right of confrontation, a trial court should give the defense wide latitude to cross-examine a prosecution witness to test credibility. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 816 […