Stowell

Since 1996, the Legislature has directed that upon conviction of lewd and lascivious acts with a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, a defendant shall be ordered “to submit to a blood . . . test for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)” “if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV [human immunodeficiency virus] has been transferred from the defendant to the victim: [][]... [][] For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the court docket and minute order if one is prepared.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subds. (a), (e)(6)(A), (B).) The question presented is whether a defendant may challenge such an order on appeal if he has failed to object to the absence of an express finding of probable cause or docket notation.

*1111 We conclude that appeal of an HIV testing order on this basis should be subject to the general rule requiring a timely objection. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Timothy Brian Stowell was charged with…

I agree with the majority that a defendant who fails to object in the trial court forfeits appeal of any deficiency in the statutorily required finding supporting an HIV testing order imposed under Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6) as well as any failure to note that finding in the docket or minutes. I write separately only to question the majority’s decision not to invoke our well-settled jurisprudence relating to unobjected—to sentencing error and to rely instead on a “general forfeiture rationale.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p 1107 Because the majority does not adequately explain how these doctrines differ or how to determine which doctrine should apply, I fear that the court’s opinion will introduce needless uncertainty into this area of the law.

The Court of Appeal relied on People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ] (Scott), in which we distinguished between unauthorized sentences—i.e., sentences that “could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case” (id. at p. 354)—and sentencing error deemed forfeited on appeal—i.e., “sentences which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or…