Moore

In 2003, we held that police officers must know of a defendant’s parole search condition to justify a warrantless search under that exception. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 335 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 73 P.3d 496 ] (Sanders).) In this case, because the hearing on defendant’s suppression motion (Pen. Code, 1 § 1538.5) occurred before we decided Sanders , the trial court concluded that the search was valid based only on evidence that defendant was subject to a parole search condition. (See In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33 , 876 P.2d 519 ] (Tyrell J.); People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734 , 968 P.2d 445 ].) The parties did not present evidence whether the officers knew of defendant’s search condition at the time of the search.

The question before us is the appropriate remedy in light of Sanders’s holding. The Court of Appeal majority here simply reversed the judgment outright, rather than remand for a new suppression hearing. For reasons that follow, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings, including to determine whether the officers knew of the search condition.

Factual…