Shin

In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight), we considered the duty of care that should govern the liability of sports participants. We recognized that careless conduct by coparticipants is an inherent risk in many sports, and that holding participants liable for resulting injuries would discourage vigorous competition. Accordingly, those involved in a sporting activity do not have a duty to reduce the risk of harm that is inherent in the sport itself. They do, however, have a duty not to increase that inherent risk. (See Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 162, 166 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 131 P.3d 383 ] (Avila).) Thus, sports participants have a limited duty of care to their coparticipants, breached only if they intentionally injure them or “engage)] in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.” (Knight, at p. 320, fh. omitted.) This application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine recognizes that by choosing to participate, individuals assume that level of risk inherent in the sport.

This case represents the next generation of…

Fifteen years ago in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight), a plurality of this court abandoned the tort doctrine of implied assumption of risk as a defense to a negligence action in sports cases. Adopted in its place was a rule eliminating between sports participants any duty to avoid injury-causing carelessness, the so-called no-duty-for-sports rule. In the intervening *501 years, this rule has found favor with a majority of this court. (See Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103 , 75 P.3d 30 ].)

I have disagreed with that rule since its inception in 1992. (See Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 336 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Just last year, in a concurring and dissenting opinion in Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 299 , 131 P.3d 383 ], I said: “I have repeatedly voiced my disagreement with this court’s adoption of that rule, which is ‘tearing at the fabric of tort law’ (Cheong v. Antablin (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1063, 1075 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 946 P.2d 817 ] (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.) ...).. . .” (Avila, supra, at p. 169 (conc. & dis. opn. of…