In re Shaputis

I agree that some evidence supports the denial of parole in this case, just as it did in the companion case of In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ] (Lawrence). As he did in Lawrence , the Governor assessed the petitioner’s case individually and considered all relevant factors before reaching a reasoned decision denying parole. Accordingly, as I stated in my dissent in Lawrence , we must defer to the judgment of the branch of government entrusted with the parole decision. (See In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 , 104 P.3d 783 ]; In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 ].)

I see no basis to distinguish this case (involving a conviction of second degree murder) from Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (involving a conviction of first degree murder) and to release Lawrence but deny parole to *1262 Shaputis. I therefore adhere to the views expressed in my Lawrence dissent CLawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1230 (dis. opn. of Chin, J.)) and, accordingly, concur in the result only.

Baxter, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.

Petitioner’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 22, 2008.…

In 1987, Richard Shaputis (petitioner) was convicted of the second degree murder of his wife, Erma, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 15 years to life in prison, and an additional two years because of his use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. In 2006, after several unfavorable parole hearings before the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) 1 and rulings by the superior court and the Court of Appeal, the Board, in compliance with the mandate of an earlier judicial decision, reluctantly found petitioner suitable for parole and set a parole date. The Governor, however, reversed the Board’s decision, concluding petitioner constituted a threat to public safety.

In a petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner challenged on several grounds the Governor’s decision denying parole. The superior court denied the petition. The Court of Appeal, in a split decision, reversed the superior court and granted the writ, concluding that neither the circumstances of petitioner’s crime, nor petitioner’s “method of coping with his guilt,” provided evidence supporting the conclusion that petitioner currently would pose an unreasonable risk to public…