Goldstein

Here we hold that California courts do not have a broad inherent power to order disclosure of grand jury materials to private litigants. In Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1117 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 , 979 P.2d 982 ] (Daily Journal), this court ruled that “the superior court’s powers to disclose grand jury testimony are only those which the Legislature has deemed appropriate.” (Id. at p. 1128.) “[I]f superior courts could disclose materials based only on their inherent powers, the statutory rules governing disclosure of grand jury testimony would be swallowed up in that large exception.” (Ibid.)

In this case, the Court of Appeal decided that courts have inherent power to order disclosure of grand jury materials to a private litigant, in the interests of justice. The court distinguished Daily Journal on the basis that it involved disclosure to the public. We reverse. The Legislature has authorized *222 limited disclosure of grand jury materials to private parties, and the Court of Appeal’s holding creates a broad exception that would swallow the statutory rules, just as in Daily Journal.

The Court of Appeal also held that no statute authorized the…

I concur in the majority opinion, which I have signed. I write briefly to express my view on a question that the majority opinion does not decide (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 232, fn. 11) but that, in my view, merits clarification; the extent to which a trial court retains nonstatutory power to order disclosure of grand jury proceedings.

In Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525 [ 2 P. 402 ] (Sontag), this court stated that “principles of public policy ... are subserved by keeping inviolate the *235 secrets of the grand jury room—except when their disclosure is absolutely necessary.” (Id. at p. 528, italics added.) Almost a century later, in Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ], this court suggested that “there may be cases of urgent and particularized need . . .” in which the policies underlying grand jury secrecy “must be made to yield to some extent in order to accommodate the demands of truth and fairness in civil litigation.” (Id. at p. 127.) Read together, these two decisions imply that courts may order disclosure of grand jury materials based on a showing of absolute necessity by the party requesting disclosure.

But thereafter,…

his allegations are to be believed, Thomas Lee Goldstein suffered an injustice as a result of the failure of our judicial system that is difficult to conceive—serving 24 years in prison for a crime he did not commit—and now seeks through a civil lawsuit to gain some small measure of the justice that has previously eluded him. I agree with the majority that the strong policy in favor of grand jury secrecy generally does not permit discovery of grand jury transcripts and materials except for that which fits into the narrow categories defined by statute. I also agree with the majority that Penal Code section 924.2* 1 is one avenue Goldstein may use to access grand jury materials. But as the majority also acknowledges, its position, and that of courts of the state for over 125 years, is consistent with a recognition of an “absolute necessity” exception to the rule against discovery of grand jury materials. (See Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525, 526, 528-529 [ 2 P. 402 ] {Sontag).) I write separately to affirm that there is indeed such an absolute necessity exception, and to explain in my view what showing a civil litigant must make in order to fit within that exception.

We affirmed…