Doolin

People v. Doolin

Bad Law
2009 Cal. LEXIS 2·45 Cal. 4th 390·87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209·198 P.3d 11
Supreme Court of CaliforniaJanuary 5, 2009No. S054489California29,568 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Corrigan, J.

A jury convicted defendant Keith Zon Doolin of the first degree murders 1 of Inez Espinoza and Peggy Tucker, and the attempted murders 2 of Alice Alva, Debbie Cruz, Marlene Mendibles, and Stephanie Kachman. For each crime, the jury found that defendant personally used a *400 firearm. 3 For each attempted murder, the jury found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. 4 The jury found hue the special circumstance allegation of multiple murder, 5 and returned a verdict of death.

The court denied defendant’s motions for a new trial 6 and penalty modification 7 and sentenced defendant to death. The court imposed and stayed a determinate sentence on the noncapital felony counts and enhancements.

This appeal is automatic. 8 We affirm the judgment in full.

I. Facts and Proceedings

A. Guilt Phase

1. Overview of Prosecution’s Case

Between November 2, 1994, and September 19, 1995, defendant murdered two Fresno prostitutes and attempted to murder four others. At trial, each surviving victim identified defendant as her assailant. One decedent’s boyfriend saw her enter a car defendant was driving on the night she was murdered. Ballistics evidence…

Concurrence in Part

Kennard, J.

Concurring and Dissenting.

In this capital case, the County of Fresno agreed to pay the fees of the appointed defense attorney. Under the contract, counsel received an $80,000 flat fee that included $60,000 for defense expenses; counsel was allowed to keep any of the money not spent. The contract thus had a built-in incentive for counsel to spend as little as possible on the defense so he could pocket more money. That is what happened here, where counsel spent less than 20 percent of the money allocated for defense expenses, keeping the remaining funds for himself.

One cannot tell from the record whether there were reasonable tactical decisions justifying defense counsel’s small expenditures and minimal efforts to prepare for the guilt phase of trial. Therefore, I join the majority in rejecting defendant’s claim that his right to counsel was violated at the guilt phase; defendant may, of course, raise that claim again in a habeas corpus petition, relying on evidence outside the appellate record.

With respect to the penalty phase, however, the record shows that there was no tactical justification for counsel’s substandard preparations. Consequently, unlike the majority, I am of…

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