Hernandez

*736 Opinion

In People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 638 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 14 , 218 P.3d 272 ] (Stevens), we held that the stationing of a courtroom deputy next to a testifying defendant is not an inherently prejudicial practice that must be justified by a showing of manifest need. We explained, however, that the trial court must exercise its own discretion and determine on a case-by-case basis whether such heightened security is appropriate. (Id. at p. 642.) Here, the trial court did not make a case-specific decision but instead deferred to a general policy when it stationed a deputy at the witness stand during defendant’s testimony. The court erred, but the error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (Watson).

BACKGROUND

Deva Belarde first met defendant outside the senior center in Antioch where she did volunteer work. About a week and a half later she saw him outside Lone Tree Liquors. She invited defendant to her house because he looked tired and dirty and she thought he might be hungry. Belarde said she did this “a lot of times with people,” and defendant “seemed to be friendly.” They walked to her house, drank, and talked for 20 or…

I agree with the majority that the trial court erred and that the error was harmless. I disagree, however, with the harmless error test the majority employs.

In People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 643 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 14 , 218 P.3d 272 ] (Stevens), this court held that a trial court’s decision to have a uniformed deputy sheriff escort a defendant to the witness stand and then stay by him as he testifies is reviewed for abuse of discretion. I dissented and concluded that, under decisions of this court as well as those of the United States Supreme Court, “such an unmistakably defendant-focused security arrangement is inherently prejudicial and permissible only if the trial court first identifies an essential case-specific state interest justifying its use.” (Id. at pp. 644—645 (dis. opn. of Moreno, J.).) A little over a year later, we find ourselves reviewing the use of a nearly identical procedure—a uniformed, armed deputy sheriff escorted defendant to the witness stand and then stood behind him as he testified. I hold to my position that such an arrangement is inherently prejudicial; I nonetheless concur in the majority’s judgment that the trial court here erred, even under…