Execution — Description of Property. — A Levy in Execution and the subsequent proceedings, inclusive of the sheriff’s deed, are not invalid because no lot of land existed having technically the designation contained in such execution, etc., if the designation was preceded by the words “known as,” and it can be shown that at the time of such proceedings the premises so designated were so known and are susceptible of identification.

Execution. — A Description Introduced, by the Phrase “Known as” is not vitiated by the subsequent phrase “marked on the official map,” when the latter is a description false in fact.

Execution — Property Acquired Subsequently to Piling of Transcript. — The statute (Laws 1850, p. 444, see. 184) referring to the lien of a judgment is not to be construed so as to limit property leviable to that owned by the judgment debtor at the time of the filing of the transcript, thus excluding subsequently acquired property.

Execution — Venditioni Exponas. — It is impolitic to disturb sales made by sheriffs under warrant of the ancient writ of venditioni exponas during the early days of the state.

Special Administrator. — The Bringing of an Action Against Adverse Occupants of the land of a deceased person by a special administrator, to conserve the rights of the estate, is within not only the right but the duty of such administrator, and it is proper for the probate court to give him express authority to bring the action.

Special Administrator. — The Eights Conserved by a Special Administrator in bringing an action against adverse occupants of the land of the deceased inures to successors to the right, title and interest of the deceased in the land.

Municipal Corporation — Grant of Land to. — The Second Section of the Act of March 26, 1851, granted and confirmed to the city of San Francisco the use and occupation of all the land described in the first section, and said grant is not affeeted by the exception made by the first section, which, exception rests virtually on. the impossible proposition that one person can be both grantor and grantee of the same deed.

Deed. — The Eeservation of Land for a Particular Use imposes upon the owner no obligation to put it to that use, but he may devote it to any lawful use that may suit him, or may at his pleasure dispose of it.