In re Barnes

I think the accusation should be dismissed. As to the first specification, the charge as made has not been established by evidence which satisfies my judgment. It does appear, however, that Gumpel was employed by the defendant in the case of Sharon v. Sharon to examine the alleged marriage contract, wdth the expectation that he would be called as a witness if his opinion was favorable. After the examination had been made, the respondent was induced to believe the result favorable to his wishes, and Gumpel was paid fifteen hundred dollars on account. Gumpel from the first talked of his poverty, of his urgent need for money, and insisted that it was a great case, and he expected to be liberally paid, and that there should be an agreement that his bill should be paid whatever it might be, and sometimes argued against the views of respondent in regard to the genuineness of the signature. Respondent, however, never supposed that Gumpel had- any doubts as to the question of forgery, but thought he was merely attempting to get more money. Never *849 theless, he continued to rely upon Gumpel, and paid him some money after this evidence of venality, and even intimated that he would…

We concur in the judgment, because in our opinion, the evidence utterly fails to show any conduct on the part of respondent for which he should either be disbarred or suspended.

I concur in the conclusion reached in Justice Temple’s opinion on the second specification of the accusation, which relates to the Tyler-Gumpel contract. I do *851 not concur in the conclusion reached as to the first specification.

Searls, C. J., was not present at the hearing, and did not participate in the decision.