United States v. Theodore Albert Geyler

Theodore Albert Geyler appeals his conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon on the ground that the conviction which served as the predicate offense is not a “conviction” within the meaning of the federal firearms statute. We reverse.

I.

In 1977, Geyler was convicted in federal district court of the offense of misprision of a felony, which carries an authorized punishment of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 4 . As a result, he lost his civil rights under Arizona law. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-904. Geyler received an absolute discharge from imprisonment by the end of 1979. Upon his absolute discharge, Arizona law granted him an automatic restoration of civil rights. See id. § 13-912 (1978). 1

In 1987, several firearms were seized from Geyler’s house. The parties stipulated that four of the firearms had trav-elled in interstate commerce and that Gey-ler knew of their presence in his house. He was charged in a two-count indictment with possession of firearms by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1), 924(a), and possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845 (e), 5861(d), 5871.…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. As the majority recognizes, supra, at 1335, Congress *1333 amended section 921(a)(20) in response to Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 461 U.S. 911 , 103 S.Ct. 1887 , 76 L.Ed.2d 815 (1983), which denied any effect to state expunctions, pardons or civil rights restorations related to state convictions for purposes of the federal firearms laws. In my view — and the majority does not appear to disagree — Congress’s purpose in passing the amendment was to enable states to determine the effect of their own convictions. The amendment was not intended to give states the ability to restore to federal felons rights impaired by federal convictions.

The majority’s reading of the words “any conviction” as allowing states to determine the effect of federal convictions creates the Dickerson problem in reverse. While I do not believe that the first sentence of the amendment (specifying that what constitutes a “conviction” is to be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held) is dis-positive of how to read the second sentence, as suggested by the government, I do think it must inform our reading of the…

932 F.2d 1330 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore Albert GEYLER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 89-10162. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted April 17, 1990. Decided May 13, 1991. Robert J. Hirsh, Brian I. Rademacher, Hirsh, Sherick & Murphy, Tucson, Ariz., for defendant-appellant. Gary Clifford Korn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Before LIVELY, * FLETCHER and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges. REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 1 Theodore Albert Geyler appeals his conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon on the ground that the conviction which served as the predicate offense is not a "conviction" within the meaning of the federal firearms statute. We reverse. I. 2 In 1977, Geyler was convicted in federal district court of the offense of misprision of a felony, which carries an authorized punishment of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4 . As a result, he lost his civil rights under Arizona law. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Sec. 13-904. Geyler received an absolute discharge from imprisonment by the end of…