The plaintiff commenced an action to obtain an accounting. After it had introduced its proof the trial court granted defendants' motion for a nonsuit. The plaintiff appealed and the judgment based on the motion for a nonsuit was reversed. (Guy Coburn, Inc., v. Tiffany Prod., Inc., 220 Cal. 418 [ 30 Pac. (2d) 996 ].) The Supreme Court remanded the action to the trial court with directions to proceed with the trial from the point where plaintiff rested its ease. However, on the second trial a hearing de novo was had. The plaintiff introduced evidence both oral and documentary. The defendants again made a motion for a nonsuit. The motion was denied. Thereupon the defendants rested. The trial court ordered judgment for the de *412 fendants. Thereafter it made a complete set of findings. In effect the findings are as follows: That the plaintiff is a corporation; that Tiffany Productions and Tiffany-Stahl Productions are both corporations; that on the 21st day of August, 1926, Harry Wurtzel, as the agent of plaintiff, assigned to Phil Goldstone Productions his motion picture rights to the book entitled “Wild Geese”; that Phil Gold-stone Productions produced the picture and Tiffany Productions, Inc., exploited and distributed it; that said picture was exhibited to the public December 3, 1927, and for a considerable period thereafter; that under the contract of assignment it was agreed that Phil Goldstone Productions would make the picture for Tiffany Productions and that the said Phil Goldstone Productions would pay to the assignor $3,850 by canceling a certain note and that it would also pay to the assignor all moneys received from Tiffany Productions; and that Tiffany Productions would pay fifty per cent of the moneys it received above the advance and sales cost. Continuing the trial court found as follows:

The plaintiff says, ‘ ‘ One who obtains the property of another for the purpose of exploiting the same and with the understanding to divide the profits has the burden of proof in an action for an accounting brought by the owner of the property. ’ ’ Conceding, without deciding, the soundness of that statement, the record contains nothing showing its applicability to the facts of this case. At all times the plaintiff assumed the burden of proof. No ruling was made by the trial court purporting to shift the burden of proof.

In its next point it claims, “The purpose of an accounting is to ascertain whether there is anything due to *414 plaintiff and the amount thereof, and a contention that there were no profits from the venture does not mitigate against the right of the plaintiff to a full accounting.” The record does not show any ruling of the trial court to the contrary. On the other hand, the evidence shows the defendants rendered numerous accounts and that no one of them was questioned until this action was filed and at no time has the plaintiff challenged the truth of any item contained in any one of the eighteen accounts that were so rendered.

Its last point is that, “A party, vested with the legal title of ownership, is the real party in interest regardless of collateral agreements as to beneficial interests of third persons.” It points to the last paragraph of the findings and contends the trial court based its judgment thereon. That finding, in view of the other findings which we have quoted, was not prejudicial. If no profits were made then the quantum to be accounted for was naught and neither the plaintiff nor any other person claiming to be a beneficiary could be wronged in a failure to account therefor.

When it transpired that the defendants had rendered eighteen accounts of their receipts and disbursements and that the plaintiff had received and retained them for several years without making any objection thereto, such facts prima facie showed stated accounts which constituted a valid defense. (1 C. J. S. 661; Robinson v. Miller, 210 App. Div. 450 [ 206 N. Y. Supp. 248 ] ; Lavers v. Hutton, 122 Misc. 516 [ 203 N. Y. Supp. 235 ].) In support of the judgment we must assume the trial court based its judgment on such defense and not on the finding discussed immediately above. (2 Cal. Jur. 1028.)

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Nourse, P. J., and Spence, J., concurred.

A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on April 18, 1940.