This is an appeal from a portion of an order distributing the estate of decedent, Austin N. Kimmis.

The essential facts are these:

These persons just named in the latter portion of paragraph Fourth of the will are the individuals directly benefited by the lower court’s interpretation of the will as expressed in the decree of distribution. The probate court ordered the specific bequests paid before payment and distribution to appellant of one-half of the residue of the estate.

Appellant urges that the probate court erred in distributing to named pecuniary legatees the cash bequests before computing appellant’s share under the will.

This proposition is untenable. It is argued that the court, after distributing the household furnishings, should then have given one-half of the estate to appellant and resorted to the remaining one-half exclusively for the payment of cash bequests. This contention is without merit. Decedent by the third paragraph of his will bequeathed to appellant not to exceed one-half of his residuary estate.

A residuary estate is defined by section 161(4) of the Probate Code as that portion which remains after all the bequests of a will are discharged. Testator was a lawyer and therefore it is presumed knew the meaning of the phrase residuary estate * . It is further provided by section 106 of the Probate Code that technical words are to be considered as having been used in their technical sense unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intention. The cash bequests in the will are general legacies and in their payment the probate court was required to resort, under section 751 of the Probate Code, to the property of the estate in the following order:

(1) Property which was expressly appropriated by the will therefor.

(2) Property not disposed of by the will.

(3) Property which was devised or bequeathed to a residuary legatee.

Since in the present ease there is not any property “expressly appropriated by the will” for the payment of general *236 bequests and there was not any “property not disposed of by the will” it follows that the probate court was bound to resort to the residuary estate for the payment of the general bequests.

The decree is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and Wilson, J., concurred.

See Estate of Bourn, 25 Cal.App.2d 590, 595 [ 78 P.2d 193 .]