Plaintiff appeals from the judgment in an action in equity.

The action is based on an alleged agreement between appellant and respondent which arose, as recited in appellant’s brief, from the following circumstances:

The record further reveals, as recited in respondents’ brief that, “On May 21, 1946, after a hearing before the Honorable John Gee Clark, Judge of the Superior Court, the respondent was restored to capacity and mental competency. This order was subsequently affirmed on appeal to this court. The respondent Amalia Blackwell and the appellant John Blackwell separated on or about May 10, 1945 and ever since said date have been living separate and apart. . . .

“While the appeals from these decrees have been pending, the respondent, Amalia Blackwell was restored to capacity, and the Security-First National Bank was discharged as Guardian of her estate and is therefore no longer an interested party to these proceedings.

“The respondent, John Paul Artel, is the son of the respondent, Amalia Blackwell, by her former marriage with John G. Artel. He has not claimed any interest in the property which is the subject of these actions.”

As will be seen from the above, there was an appeal from the order restoring respondent to competency. Quoting from the opinion by the District Court of Appeal disposing of said appeal in “Guardianship of the person and estate of Amalia M. Blackwell” reported in 77 Cal.App.2d at p. 282 [ 175 P.2d 44 ] : “Pursuant to her own petition she was by order of the court entered on May 21,1946, restored to capacity and mental competency. Her husband, John H. Blackwell, who objected to her petition, brings the matter here by appeal from the last mentioned order.” The appeal in that matter was dismissed December 13, 1946; the respondent was therefore still an incompetent when the trial of the within action was ctimmenced on June 28, 1946.

The court found for the defendant. It is contended on appeal in substance that the evidence does not support the findings and that the court erred in sustaining demurrers to the complaint and amended complaint.

*406 Prom what is certified as a “partial transcript” by the shorthand reporter, the record reveals that the plaintiff, who was the only witness at the trial, testified extensively as recorded in 224 pages of the transcript. Many exhibits were offered and received including numerous receipts, signed by plaintiff. On cross-examination the following occurred:

Although the sole witness at the trial, it does not follow that appellant’s contention with regard to the findings as hereinbefore noted must be upheld. It is for the trial judge to determine the value and effect of evidence unless such evidence is declared by law to be conclusive; and the testimony of the plaintiff herein is not an example of such evidence. In the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion or, that the effect given to the testimony was arbitrary, the value and effect of the evidence as found by the trial judge, if within reason, must be upheld on appeal. There is no such showing in the within appeal.

■ As to the amendment to the original complaint- and the first amended complaint to which demurrers were sustained, the record is not complete. However, inasmuch as the record does show that the trial comprised three days, viz¡, June 28,, 29 and 30th, and that the amendment to the complaint was filed July 1st and the first amended complaint was filed July 11th, it is a reasonable inference that requests to file such amendments were made after the evidence was concluded. An *407 examination of the proposed amendments in the light of the record reveals no error in the court’s orders sustaining the demurrers thereto.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and the orders appealed from are affirmed.

York, P. J., and White, J., concurred.