Defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of San Diego as follows:

The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state a public offense. The court sustained the demurrer, dismissed the complaint, and the People appeal.

By 1939 Statutes, chapter 730, section 1, the Legislature enacted the Pure Drugs Act. This has been set up in the Health and Safety Code, division 21, chapter 2, sections 26200-26385. The administration of the act is committed to the State Board of Health, which is given broad powers to promote the public health and safety. (See Health & Saf. Code, §§ 200-211, inclusive.) Under the act the term “advertisement” means “all representations . . . which are likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase of drugs. ...” (Health & Saf. Code, § 26209.)

Drugs are “. . . (2) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man. . . .; (3) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man. . . .” (Health & Saf. Code, § 26200.)

By section 26286 the dissemination of any false advertisement of a drug is prohibited. The violation of any provision of the act is made a misdemeanor and punished by the terms of section 26295.

Section 26273 provides as follows:

and section 26271, under which defendant is charged, provides in part as follows:

From the portions of the Pure Drugs Act referred to above, we conclude that the advertisement prohibited by section 26271 as false is one that is likely to induce a purchase of a drug which is prohibited by section 26286 with the exception set up in section 26273.

Defendant asserts that the charge is defective because it does not negative this exception.

It is sufficient to limit the charge to the gist of the offense. (People v. Nugent, 4 Cal. 341; Ex parte Hornef, 154 Cal. 355, 360 [ 97 P. 891 ].) If defendant’s product is proper to advertise under other provisions of the act, that is a matter of defense. (People v. Pierce, 14 Cal.2d 639, 643 [ 96 P.2d 784 ].) 50 in a prosecution against a physician for violating section 8% of the act to regulate the sale and use of poisons (1907 Stats. 124), the complaint is not defective in not negativing the good faith of the physician in prescribing morphine for the use of a habitual user thereof and that the patient was not suffering from an uncurable disease, ailment or injury. (See In re Lord, 199 Cal. 773, 776 [ 250 P. 714 ].) This contention of the defendant is untenable. Neither, as defendant claims, is the complaint defective as to him because of his assertion that he is a licensed chiropractor. We find nothing in the Chiropractic Act which would exempt the defendant as such from the requirements of the Pure Drugs Act. We think the charging part of the complaint, which is in ordinary concise language and in the words of the statute, is clear and puts defendant on notice of the offense charged. (Pen. Code § 1426.)

Defendant further claims the section is in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the federal Constitution.

“. . . due process of law has never been a term of fixed and invariable content.” (Federal Comm’n. Comm. v. Station WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275 [ 69 S.Ct. 1097 , 93 L.Ed. 1353 ].)

*930 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550, 551 [ 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 ], the court said:

In Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224, 225 [ 69 S.Ct. 550 , 93 L.Ed. 632 , 10 A.L.R.2d 945 ], the court says:

In a note in 93 L.Ed. 637 it is said that:

We may be guided by the above quoted decisions of the *931 Supreme Court of the United States on the issues of due process and equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment, because that court is the final arbiter of those issues. (Brookes v. City of Oakland, 160 Cal. 423 [ 117 P. 433 ].)

Those issues find like solution in the decisions of our own courts. In Hollywood Turf Club v. Daugherty, 36 Cal.2d 352, 359 [ 224 P.2d 359 ], the court says:

In the light of these and many other authorities that might be cited (see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 521-539 [ 54 S.Ct. 505 , 78 L.Ed. 940 ], and notes 8, 9, 12, 13 and 24), it would appear that the judicial responsibility is ended "If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, . . . .” (Nebbia v. New York, supra, 537 ; California Physicians’ Service v. Garrison, supra, 802, 803 .)

Coming to the merits of the ease, a proper legislative purpose in restricting the uncontrolled trade in drugs which may be poisonous has already been decided in In re Gray, 206 Cal. 497, 499 [ 274 P. 974 ]. The magnitude of the national evil, which the Pure Drugs Act sought to remedy in this state, is revealed in a note in 53 Harvard Law Review 828, from which it is made to appear that the unregulated trade in drugs without value in diseases resulted in large *932 annual cost in life, health and money to suffering purchasers among the public, hopefully eager to buy. While public opinion, informed by experience and reading, may not decide constitutionality for the courts (see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 [ 28 S.Ct. 324 , 52 L.Ed. 551 ]), it certainly has an obvious bearing on the rational exercise of legislative power.

We come to the result that section 26271, supra, is a reasonable and proper statuté. On the score of due process, and the opportunity of defendant to establish the merit of his product, section 26273 affords defendant all that he may ask under the law. (Neslen v. Board of Health, 70 Cal.App.2d 202 [ 160 P.2d 862 ]; Downing v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 85 Cal.App.2d 30 [ 192 P.2d 39 ]; Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d 534, 541, 542 [ 110 P.2d 992 ].)

The judgment is reversed.

Turrentine, P. J., and Glen, J., concurred.