From a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial before the court in an action to recover damages for breach of a contract to sell a food market, defendant appeals.

Defendant’s sole contention is that the findings are not supported by the evidence.

This proposition is devoid of merit. The findings and judgment based thereon must be affirmed if there is any substantial evidence in support thereof. (Graves v. Smolicz, 110 Cal.App.2d 221, 225 [3] [ 242 P.2d 371 ].)

The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or otherwise, which will support the findings of the trial court. (McKee v. Mires, 110 Cal.App. 2d 517, 518 [ 242 P.2d 954 ].)

Applying the foregoing rules to the findings in the instant case a review of the record discloses the following:

This finding is supported by plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4, which contains the terms of the offer made by plaintiffs, together with the alterations which were initialed by all parties plus the testimony of Charlotte Haagen, hereinafter referred to as the broker, that she saw defendant who made the offer to her, let her read it and discussed the proposition with her. She told defendant she held plaintiffs’ check in the sum of $500 as a deposit.

III

This finding is amply supported by plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4, plus the broker’s testimony that on October 2, . 1948, she discussed the offer and counteroffer with the defendant and at such time the changes in price were made in Exhibit 4 and were initialed. In addition, the broker testified that defendant at such time' said if the counteroffer was accepted she was ready to go into escrow. Also, defendant admitted having initialed the changes on Exhibit 4 and having affixed her name at the bottom of the instrument.

IV

*348 The broker gave direct testimony in support of each fact in the foregoing finding, which sustains it.

V

The broker testified that after leaving defendant’s place of business she contacted plaintiffs and showed them the counteroffer of defendant; that plaintiffs initialed the changes on Exhibit 4 and accepted the counteroffer, permitting the broker to retain the deposit check previously given her as a deposit on the counteroffer. She further testified that as soon as she was able to contact defendant she communicated to her the fact that plaintiffs had accepted her counteroffer. This testimony supports the finding.

VI

The foregoing finding with the exception of the statement that defendant after repudiating her agreement to sell to plaintiffs sold the market to her husband, is fully supported by the testimony herein set forth.

The portion of the finding relative to the sale of the market to defendant’s husband is supported by a stipulation entered into by the parties in the trial court that such was the fact.

*349 VII

The broker testified that on October 2, 1948, the market was worth a minimum of $10,000 and a maximum of $13,000 and the finding is thus supported by the evidence.

VIII

The parties stipulated in open court that plaintiffs purchased the market from Louis Bitner, husband of defendant, on November 19, 1948.

One of the plaintiffs testified that plaintiffs obtained possession of the market on November 29, 1948, which supports the finding.

IX

The foregoing finding is immaterial since it is in favor of defendant.

X

The finding supra is amply supported by the evidence set forth above. There is left a mere mathematical calculation to ascertain the amount of damage sustained by plaintiffs as a result of defendant’s breach of her contract.

The record in the instant case is exceptionally free from error of any kind.

*350 Prom the foregoing findings and the evidence recited in support thereof it is obvious that the present appeal is unjustified, vexatious, frivolous and was taken solely for the purpose of delaying and harassing plaintiff. As said by this court in Sipe v. McKenna, 105 Cal.App.2d 373, at 375 [ 233 P.2d 615 ], speaking through the late Justice Wilson, “This appeal has not only caused plaintiff an unnecessary expense but has consumed the time of this court which might have been spent in determining meritorious cases. Such appeals apparently can be discouraged only by the imposition of a penalty on the offender as authorized by section 957 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Citing eases.) ”

The judgment is affirmed, damages are imposed upon defendant-appellant in the sum of $150 for having taken and prosecuted a frivolous appeal and the trial court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for said sum in addition to the costs of appeal.

Moore, P. J., and Pox, J., concurred.