This is an appeal by Sutter Basin Corporation, Ltd., a corporation, from a judgment rendered against it, whereby it was enjoined from using the east levee of respondent Reclamation District No. 1500, which levee is a part of the west levee of the Sutter By-pass, for vehicular traffic and for the grazing of livestock.

After the commencement of the action intervention was permitted by the People of the State of California and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District, acting by and through the State Reclamation Board.

The cause was tried and briefed to the trial court, which thereupon rendered a written opinion which so clearly, adequately and fully discusses the legal and factual issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence, and the decision of the court with respect thereto, that we will adopt the parts of that opinion hereinafter quoted as the opinion of this court on appeal. That portion of the trial court’s opinion' so adopted reads as follows:

“From the foregoing, the Court cannot help but conclude that the said assertion of rights by defendant to pasture said levee and to use the same for vehicular travel in a manner contrary to and in conflict with the regulations of the Army engineers, constitutes a purpose now inconsistent with the flood control plans of the State of California, as they existed at the time of filing this action. The Court does not believe that such a conclusion has the effect of depriving defendant of any property without due process of law or without paying just compensation therefor. To the contrary, it considers such a conclusion to be a direct and proximate result of defendant’s own contract, namely the quitclaim deeds of June 30, 1926.”

We think the reasoning by which the trial court arrived at its stated conclusions with respect to the nature of the reservations contained in the pertinent title deeds and the effect of the changes in the over-all flood control plan are sound. The interrelationships of the state agencies and the federal government are so many and so mutually interdependent as to make the several undertakings of the public agencies part and parcel of that plan and specifically this reasonably includes the rules and regulations for maintenance and care of the subject levee as a part of the whole integrated levee system. It follows, therefore, that the rules and regulations of the Army engineers promulgated for the purpose of making uniform the requirements for maintenance and care of the levees rightfully and finally control and fix the reserved rights of defendant; and this, as the trial court has said, by force of the very reservations themselves which are contained in the deeds it and its predecessors have executed. It is obvious that this holding may presently and in practical effect so restrict those rights as to render them of little value, but that is a situation foreshadowed in the reservations themselves.

The decree entered by the trial court and from which this appeal is taken reads as follóws:

Appellant specifically argues against the propriety of the foregoing decree, as follows: “(a) The injunction is too broad in prohibiting any and all acts which injure or damage said east levee, (b) The trial court erred in enjoining the use of the levee for pasture purposes, (c) The use for pasture purposes was not unauthorized and is not inconsistent with the use of the levee for reclamation purposes.”

In support of its first contention, appellant argues that the decree is too broad in that it restricts any and all acts which injure or damage the levee and appellant says: “The first hoof marks on the levee, the first blade of grass bent down, the first swirl of dust from a passing car, constitute an act of contempt.” The language of the decree is simple and clear and we do not know how better words could be found to express the clear right of respondents to have their levee protected against injury or damage by any act of appellant. We cannot suppose that acts such as appellant states would be acts of contempt, would, in a hearing charging contempt, be held to be such. We must assume reasonable action of the trial court in the future in determining whether its decree has in fact been violated.

The second contention of appellant, that the trial court erred in enjoining the use of the levee for pasture purposes, *547 is, of course, an objection to any decree at all and is answered by what has heretofore been quoted from the opinion of the trial court. While it is true, as appellant argues, that a right of pasturage carries with it a right of entry to the land to be pastured and constitutes an estate in the land itself, yet these considerations can be freely admitted without in any wise impugning the decree appealed from. That decree, as has been said, is based upon the proposition that the limiting of the reserved rights to such exercise as from time to time may be authorized by the Army engineers is part and parcel of the existing flood control plans of the State of California and, therefore, expressly permitted by the language of the reservations. In support of its third contention that the use of the levees for pasture purposes was not unauthorized and was not inconsistent with the use of the levee for reclamation purposes, appellant’s argument may be summarized as follows : That the reservations having been made when the title deeds were executed, cannot be affected by regulations of the Army engineers. Says appellant: “We think there has been confusion in this ease between the rules and between flood control plans of the State of California as referred to in the reservation of the deeds.” What has heretofore been said obviously answers this contention. Any use of the levee for pasturage except as permitted by the regulations of the engineers is an unauthorized use.

Appellant has in its brief requested that this court take additional evidence and make such further orders as may be deemed proper under section 956a of the Code of Civil Procedure. As we read the brief, this request is predicated upon things which happened after the making of the decree appealed from, including application to the state engineer, as the responsible agent under the regulations of the Army engineers, for leave to make use of the levee for vehicular and pasturage use and the denial of the request by that officer. Appellant says the trial court found that it was entitled to these uses under permission of the state engineer and that he has arbitrarily denied such use. It asks us to appoint a master to take testimony and, having done so, that this court “lay down the conditions under which the defendant is to use its acknowledged right.”

Since we have held herein that authority to permit the use of the levee for the desired purposes lies with the Army engineers, we obviously cannot accede to the request to take evidence and the same is denied. If, as claimed, the *548 denial of use was arbitrary, then proof thereof must be made in the trial court in a proceeding to ascertain if respondents are abusing the court’s decree. They sought and obtained a decree in equity. They have not appealed but have accepted it. That decree they may use for the lawful purpose for which it was handed down—but it may not be abused.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Peek, J., and Schottky, J., concurred.

Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 20, 1954.