22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4e6,This is a purported appeal by plaintiff from a minute order dated March 16, 1953, and entered March 18, 1953, denying plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, court costs, allowances for support of an illegitimate child, a restraining order and medical expenses. The minute order, omitting the title of the court and cause, reads: This is the sole question necessary for us to determine: Is the foregoing minute order an appealable order? It is not. No appeal lies from a minute order which shows on its face that it is a mere preliminary entry authorizing a subsequent order or judgment. (Butler v. City & County of San Francisco, 104 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 [1] [ 231 P.2d 75 ]; Kindig v. Palos Verde Homes Assn., 33 Cal.App.2d 349, 354 [4] [ 91 P.2d 645 ]; Conley v. Apablasa, 42 Cal.App.2d 565, 567 [2] [ 10 P.2d 367 ]; Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.App.2d 212, 213 [1] [ 113 P.2d 892 ].) In the present case the minute order from which the purported appeal is taken was a mere preliminary entry authorizing a subsequent order. This is obvious from the last sentence in the order which we have italicized. The purported appeal from the order is dismissed. Moore, P. J., and Fox, J., concurred. A petition for a rehearing was denied December 23, 1953.24:T510,

This is a purported appeal by plaintiff from a minute order dated March 16, 1953, and entered March 18, 1953, denying plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees, court costs, allowances for support of an illegitimate child, a restraining order and medical expenses. The minute order, omitting the title of the court and cause, reads:

This is the sole question necessary for us to determine:

Is the foregoing minute order an appealable order?

It is not. No appeal lies from a minute order which shows on its face that it is a mere preliminary entry authorizing a subsequent order or judgment. (Butler v. City & County of San Francisco, 104 Cal.App.2d 126, 128 [1] [ 231 P.2d 75 ]; Kindig v. Palos Verde Homes Assn., 33 Cal.App.2d 349, 354 [4] [ 91 P.2d 645 ]; Conley v. Apablasa, 42 Cal.App.2d 565, 567 [2] [ 10 P.2d 367 ]; Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.App.2d 212, 213 [1] [ 113 P.2d 892 ].)

In the present case the minute order from which the purported appeal is taken was a mere preliminary entry authorizing a subsequent order. This is obvious from the last sentence in the order which we have italicized.

The purported appeal from the order is dismissed.

Moore, P. J., and Fox, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied December 23, 1953.