Appeal from part of a decree of distribution. The question is whether Antoinette Puller McMunn forfeited her rights under the will of' the deceased by contesting or attacking "or opposing the will, or in seeking' to impair or invalidate any of its provisions, or in endeavoring to succeed to part of the estate otherwise than through the will.

Alice I. Puller died testate on October 13, 1952. Her will left the residue of the estate in trust with directions to pay the income to Mrs. McMunn for life. It contained this in terrorem provision:

On October 23, 1952, the executrix and executor named in the will petitioned for probate, and notice of the hearing was duly posted and published. Prior to the hearing and on November 18, 1952, Mrs. McMunn filed written grounds of opposition to its probate and caused a citation to be issued. In the opposition she alleged unsoundness of mind, want of due execution, and undue influence exercised by Elizabeth Fuller Pierrong, her daughter and granddaughter of the deceased.

On November 21, 1952, the court set the contest for trial for February 26, 1953. On January 16, 1953, the executrix and the executor filed a general and special demurrer to the opposition and a motion to strike the entire document and various parts thereof. At the hearing of the demurrer and the motion to strike on January 23, 1953, by stipulation the motion to strike was granted except as to two paragraphs thereof and the demurrer was ordered off calendar. On February 20, 1953, Mrs. McMunn filed a dismissal of the opposition.

The will was thereafter admitted to probate and an executrix *823 and executor appointed. The executor later resigned. The petition for final distribution of the estate stated that the will devised and bequeathed the residue in trust to pay the income to Mrs. McMunn for life, alleged she had filed a contest of the will in which she opposed its admission to probate and that by filing the contest she forfeited her right to participate as beneficiary under the trust. Mrs. McMunn filed objections to the petition, alleging the contest was dismissed before an answer had been filed and a trial of the issues had, and that she was entitled to the income from the trust. The court sustained the objections; found that by reason of the fact the contest did not proceed to trial and judgment Mrs. McMunn did not contest the will or attack or oppose or in any other manner seek to impair or invalidate any provision of the will or endeavor to succeed to any part of the estate other than through the will; concluded she had not forfeited her right to take under the will; and distributed the income of the trust to Mrs. McMunn for life. Miss Pierrong appeals from that part of the decree ordering the trustee of the trust to pay the income thereof to Mrs. McMunn for life.

Miss Pierrong contends Mrs. McMunn violated the in terrorem, provision of the will and thereby forfeited all rights thereunder. Mrs. McMunn claims the document she filed was a mere “paper contest,” and since she dismissed before trial she does not come within the purview of the in terrorem provision.

It is a cardinal rule of construction that the intent of the testatrix, as manifested by the terms of the will, must be given effect. The property of a testatrix is hers to dispose of as she wills, and she is not called on to consult or follow the wishes or views of her heirs or beneficiaries or of courts or juries. (In re Spencer, 96 Cal. 448, 452 [ 31 P. 453 ] ; Estate of Markham, 46 Cal.App.2d 307 , 314 [ 115 P.2d 866 ].) The testatrix was free to dispose of her property on whatever condition she wished to impose so long as the condition was not prohibited by law or opposed to public policy. She could give or refrain from giving, and" could attach to her gifts any lawful condition which her reason or caprice might dictate. " She was disposing of her own property and the beneficiary claiming thereunder must take the gift, if at all, on the terms offered. (Estate of Miller, 156 Cal. 119, 121 [ 103 P. 842 , 23 L.RA.N.S. 868] ; In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 389 [ 220 P. 301 , 30 A.L.R. 1008 ]; Estate of Markham, 46 Cal.App.2d 307 , 314 [ 115 P.2d 866 ].)

*824 A provision in a will providing for forfeiture of a legacy or devise in the event of a contest of the will by a legatee or devisee is valid and binding on such legatee or devisee. (Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 439 [ 101 P. 443 , 17 Ann.Cas. 993, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 953 ]; Lobb v. Brown, 208 Cal. 476, 484 [ 281 P. 1010 ] ; Estate of Markham, 46 Cal.App.2d 307, 314 [ 115 P.2d 866 ]; Estate of Howard, 68 Cal.App.2d 9, 11 [ 155 P.2d 841 ].) An in terrorem provision in a will is not against public policy and must be enforced as written. (In re Garcelon, 104 Cal. 570, 590 [ 38 P. 414 , 43 Am.St.Rep, 134, 32 L.R.A. 595 ] ; Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436, 439-441 [ 101 P. 443 , 17 Ann.Cas. 993, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 953 ]; Estate of Miller, 156 Cal. 119, 121-122 [ 103 P. 842 , 23 L.R.A.N.S. 868 ].) An in terrorem clause is to be strictly construed. “The rule that a forfeiture clause is to be strictly construed means simply that no wider scope is to be given to the language employed than is plainly required. It does not require the court to put a strained or overtechnical construction upon the language employed, ignoring the essence of the condition imposed upon the legacy and refusing to give effect to the lawful intention of the testatrix to enable a legatee to affirm a will so far as it is to her own' profit and at the same time repudiate the validity of its provisions which are for the benefit of others. No artificial distinctions are to be taken advantage of or quibbling indulged in to the end that a person plainly and palpably coming within the scope of the forfeiture clause may by ‘some hook or' crook’ escape the penalty of forfeiture.” (In re Kitchen, 192 Cal. 384, 389 [ 220 P. 301 , 30 A.L.R. 1008 ].) Whether there has been a contest within the meaning of the language used in a will is to be determined according to the circumstances in each case. (Estate of Mathie, 64 Cal. App.2d 767, 776 [ 149 P.2d 485 ].)

The contention that because the grounds of opposition to probate of the will were dismissed after the hearing of the motion to strike, and were not brought to trial there was no contest is answered by Estate of Hite, 155 Cal. 436 [ 101 P. 443 , 17 Ann.Cas. 993, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 953 ]. The will in that' case merely said that if anyone contests my will he shall receive no part whatever of my estate and any bequest or devise is revoked. Before probate one of the legatees named in the will filed a contest of a codicil on the ground of nonexeeixtion, want of mental capacity, and undue influence; and she and another legatee filed a contest of a second codicil *825 on the same grounds. Answers were filed. The contestants filed a motion to strike parts of the answers. Before the motion was heard the chief beneficiary under the second codicil agreed to pay the contestants more than they were bequeathed by the codicils but less than they were bequeathed by the will. The opposition was thereupon dismissed and the will and codicils admitted to probate. The probate court held that the legatees had not contested the will. The opinion of the Supreme Court reversing the probate court is so directly applicable to the case at bar that we are constrained to quote at length from it. The court said (p. 441):

Said the court in Estate of Bergland, 180 Cal. 629 (p. 634 [ 182 P. 277 , 5 A.L.R. 1363 ]) :

Estate of Markham, 46 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 115 P.2d 866 ], says (p. 315):

In Estate of Howard, 68 Cal.App.2d 9 [ 155 P.2d 841 ], Mr. Justice McComb wrote (p. 11) :

In Estate of Lynn, 109 Cal.App.2d 468 [ 240 P.2d 1001 ], the court declared (p. 472):

In Swift v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 358 [ 247 P.2d 6 ], a petition for probate of a lost or destroyed will was filed. Certain heirs at law of the deceased “filed answers denying many allegations of the petition, including soundness of mind, lack of duress, fraud or undue influence, due execution and existence of the instrument, its fraudulent destruction, and the contents thereof, and praying that the purported will be denied probate.” The court said (p. 361) :

The Restatement says:

The wording of the in terrorem provision of Mrs. Fuller’s will is broad, definite, and explicit. It was drawn by a lawyer. It says that:

It cannot be said that the opposition to probate of the will did not bring Mrs. McMunn within the purview of these prohibitions. To do so would be to disregard plain language and the intention of the testatrix evidenced thereby. It would be to say that Mrs. McMunn did not “directly or indirectly” “contest,” “attack,” “oppose,” or “in any manner seek to impair or invalidate” the will. It would be to say that she did not endeavor to succeed to any part of the estate otherwise than through the will.

Mrs. McMunn says this was a mere “paper contest.” She relies on the dictum in Estate of Hite, supra, 155 Cal. 436 , *830 that “It does not follow herefrom that the mere filing of a paper contest, which has been abandoned without action and has not been employed to thwart the testator’s expressed wishes, need be judicially declared a contest.” She ignores the sentence immediately following which says, “ But wherever an opponent uses the appropriate machinery of the law to the thwarting of the testator’s expressed wishes, whether he succeed or fail, his action is a contest.” Estate of Hite does not tell us what a “paper contest” is, and it is not necessary in the present case to decide what sort of a contest would constitute a mere “paper contest.” This was manifestly not such a contest. It was the use of the appropriate machinery of the law to thwart the expressed wishes of the testatrix. Mrs. McMunn charged: her mother, the deceased, was not of sound mind at the time the will was executed; her mental faculties had become so impaired she was easily and unduly influenced by those in whom she had confidence, particularly Mrs. McMunn’s daughter, Miss Pierrong, who completely dominated her grandmother; Miss Pierrong succeeded in substituting her will for the will of the deceased; the purported will was not the free and voluntary act of the deceased. The prayer was that the will be not admitted to probate. The grounds of opposition were verified by Mrs. McMunn one month after her mother’s death. In view of the dismissal of the contest and the admission of the will to probate, it must be assumed there was not a scintilla of justification for basing a contest on any one of the grounds alleged. The effect of the opposition, had it been successful, would have been to defeat the intentions of the testatrix and to give Mrs. McMunn a much larger part of the estate than she was given by the will.

Mrs. McMunn attacked the validity of the will; she sought to have it declared void. She besmirched the reputation of the testatrix, her mother, when she was no longer alive to defend herself, and paraded the family skeletons after her death. As said in Estate of Markham, 46 Cal.App.2d 307 [ 115 P.2d 866 ], we cannot conceive of more outright and direct attack upon the validity of the will, or a more positive effort, in violation of the forfeiture clause to contest this will or attack, oppose or in any manner seek to impair or invalidate any provision thereof, or endeavor to succeed to any part of the estate otherwise than through this will.

Construing the in terrorem provision in the present case as strictly as may be, when we read it according to the plainly *831 expressed intent of the testatrix, the conclusion is inescapable that Mrs. McMunn brought herself under its ban. The intent of the testatrix is so clearly and definitely expressed as to allow no room for any other construction than that it was her intent, in the event a contest of the nature of that in the present case were filed by a legatee under the will, the legacy of such beneficiary should be reduced to $1.00. It would be allowing the intention of the testatrix to be overthrown by indulgence in very finely drawn distinctions to say that one who invokes the aid of a court in opposition to the probate of a will of the character of that at bar does not in a very obvious sense “contest,” “attack,” “oppose,” or “in any manner seek to impair or invalidate” any of its provisions. We see no escape from the conclusion that the testatrix by the use of the language employed, which is extremely broad, intended to penalize the commencement of a contest of the nature of that filed by Mrs. McMunn.

The part of the decree appealed from is reversed.

Shinn, P. J., and Wood (Parker), J., concurred.