Appeal from a judgment decreeing that an automobile be forfeited to the state, subject to the lien of the legal owner, on the ground it had been used in the unlawful transportation of narcotics.

*612 The court found and decreed that the legal owner had made a’ reasonable investigation of the morals, responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser prior to the creation of its .interest. Plaintiff appeals.

. . Plaintiff first contends. the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that a reasonable investigation had been made. The argument.is that the only evidence with respect to the investigation was regarding the standard operating procedure of the legal owner.

Section-11620 of the Health' and Safety Code in pertinent part provides: “The claimant of any right, title or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage, or conditional sales contract to be bona fide and that his right, title, or interest was created after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser, and without any knowledge that the vehicle was being, or was to be, used for the purpose charged. ’ ’

It was stipulated that the automobile was sold to Odis B. Hendrix on a conditional sales contract in the usual course of business; the contract was bona fide and valid in all respects ; the seller—legal owner—had no knowledge that the automobile would be used for any unlawful purpose.

The legal owner, without objection, introduced in evidence a document titled “Purchaser’s Credit Statement,” designated Exhibit' C. The exhibit showed numerous written notations. About one-third of the way down the document on the left-hand side was a notation, “OK by his employer.” To the immediate right of this was the notation, “OK by employer.” To the far right was the notation, “OK his employer.”

•Miss Molloy, the credit manager of the legal owner, testified she-recognized the handwriting on Exhibit C as that of JuneEatario, who was in the employ of the legal owner in the credit department at the time of the sale. She testified to the method of preparation of the document by explaining the standard procedure followed by the credit department in making the investigation of a purchaser as follows: “We first call the employer and if the employment has been a year or two years, we ask the employer—well, first, naturally we ask if the person has been employed. Secondly, we ask as to their knowledge of the good moral character of the employee, and if he has been m any difficulties that' they know of; and thirdly, if his home address is the same as is stated on the application. Q. Now, according to your standard procedure, Miss Molloy, what is1 *613 "done by the. person making-the phone call in response to ¿ny answers they may receive on such phone calls? A. Well, they write ‘okayed by employer’ in the separate sections.”

.Miss Molloy testified the first notation on Exhibit C meant Miss Fatario had called the employer o£ the prospective purchaser and was informed by him that the purchaser had been employed the length of time he had specified in his credit statement; the second notation meant she had asked the employer if the purchaser was of good moral character; the third notation meant she had ascertained from the employer that the purchaser’s home address was the same as on the credit statement given by the purchaser.

' There also appeared on Exhibit C notations with respect tp nine' business firms and three banks. As to these Miss Molloy testified the legal owner, in investigating the purchaser, obtained the information noted from a service it used, which service had a record of all business houses,in Los Angeles; from the service, it obtained information on the customer, including anything that would appear in the legal records with respect to whether the purchaser had been subject to criminal or civil suit; and the service picked up all of .this information and relayed it to the legal owner.

The “Purchaser’s Credit Statement,” signed by the purchaser, gave his wife’s name, stated she was employed,' and by whom. Miss Molloy testified Miss Fatario ha‘d checked with the employer of the purchaser’s wife; the notationOK by employer” applied equally to the purchaser’s wife; and if there had been anything derogatory it would have been noted on exhibit C.

Exhibit C was competent evidence to establish the facts therein stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1953f; Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal.2d 600, 608 [ 145 P.2d 1 ].) The weight to be given the document was for the trial court. (Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Engineering Co., 43 Cal.2d 1, 7-8 [ 271 P.2d 34 ].) ."Whether the investigation was reasonable is a question of fact. . (People v. One 1952 Ford Sedan, 146 Cal.App.2d 183, 187-188 [ 303 P.2d 832 ].)

The testimony of Miss Molloy was with respect to what investigation had been made by Miss Fatario, not merely; as to the standard operating procedure of the legal owner. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the evidence was not sufficient to support the finding that á reasonable investigation had been made. ...

People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 113 Cal.App.2d 578 *614 [ 248 P.2d 786 ], relied on by the People, is not in point. The court there found that the legal owner did not make a reasonable investigation; here the court found the contrary. In that case there were no records of an investigation produced; here the record and the testimony of Miss Molloy showed the details of the investigation.

The People next contend the property was transferred to the purchaser before the investigation was made.

On September 15, 1956, the purchaser and the legal owner signed a document styled “Sales Order, Confirmation And Sales Agreement. ’ ’ This document provided:

Following the conditions, the purchaser’s signature appears afjer the word “Buyer.” The automobile was delivered on September 15, 1956. The investigation was made on September 17, 1956.

The legal owner did not submit its contracts to á financial institution. It financed its own contracts. By the terms of *615 the “Sales Order, Confirmation And Sales Agreement” the purchaser was obligated to return the automobile to the dealer in the event its investigation was unacceptable.

Under a contract of sale the property is transferred to the buyer at the time the parties intend it to be transferred; and their intention may be disclosed by their conduct, common usage, and the circumstances of the case. (Civ. Code, § 1738.) The conduct of the parties may disclose their intent as to when property was transferred from seller to buyer. (Everly v. Creech, 139 Cal.App.2d 651, 657 [ 294 P.2d 109 ].) The passage of an interest in property is governed by the intention of the parties whenever such intention can be ascertained, and it is only when there is no indication as to such intention that the seller can be said to have unconditionally delivered the property to the buyer. (Woodbine v. Van Horn, 29 Cal.2d 95, 106-107 [ 173 P.2d 17 ]; Goldberg v. Southwestern Metals Corp., 92 Cal.App.2d 819, 821 [ 208 P.2d 75 ].)

Referring to section 11620 of the Health and Safety Code, the court in People v. One 1950 Pontiac Sedan, 153 Cal. App.2d 15 [ 313 P.2d 863 ], stated (p. 19) :

When read as a whole, whether the document signed on September 15, 1956, constituted merely a sales order or a conditional sales contract, it indicates that it was intended thereby, to allow whoever financed the contract time within which to make a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser. At bar, the legal owner was the financing institution. In view of the language of the statute and the provisions of the “Sales Order, Confirmation And Sales Agreement” and under the facts, found, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the legal owner had proved the property was not transferred to the buyér until after a reasonable investigation within the meaning of the statute.

Affirmed.

Shinn, P. J., and Wood (Parker), J., concurred.