Talley

I concur. We have no clear-cut decision by the U. S. Supreme Court on the supposed right to publish anonymously; two of their cases which may bear on the question are conflicting. See People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928), 278 U.S. 63 [ 49 S.Ct. 61 , 73 L.Ed. 184 , 62 A.L.R. 785 ], and National Association for Advancement of Colored People v. State of Alabama (1958), 357 U.S. 449 [ 78 S.Ct. 1163 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 ]. The distinction which Mr. Justice Harlan draws between the two seems to be that the members of N. A. A. C. P. are good guys and the members of Ku Klux Klan are wicked men.

Defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor, having violated the.provisions of Los Angeles Municipal Ordinance Number 77,000, section 28.06, in that he distributed a handbill which did not then and there have upon it the name and address of the person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured it, nór the same information as to the person who caused the same to be distributed, nor the true names and addresses of the owners, managers or agents of the fictitious person and club who sponsored the handbill. Defendant appeals from conviction on the ground that the ordinance violates United' State's Constitution, Amendments 14 and 1.

The appellant concedes that the decision in People v. Arnold (1954), 127 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844 [ 273 P.2d 711 ], disposes of his contentions adversely but asks reconsideration and reversal of the view there taken submitting substantially the same brief that was then submitted to this court. We adhere to the decision in the ease of People v. Arnold , and the conviction of appellant must be affirmed.

The essence of the right of “free speech” is derived *800 from the historical connotation of the phrase, not from giving uncontrolled effect to the adjective…

I dissent. Several propositions with respect to the problem before us seem to me to stand established beyond argument, and to recognize them is to narrow the field in which reasonable minds may take opposing position. The *806 first is that the freedom of the press, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and by section 9 of article I of our state Constitution, extends to the particular type of printed matter known as “handbills.” It is so stated in Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), 303 U.S. 444, 452 [ 58 S.Ct. 666 , 82 L.Ed. 949, 954 ], and in Young v. People of State of California (1939), 308 U.S. 147 [ 60 S.Ct. 146 , 84 L.Ed. 155 ], a provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (§28.01) that then declared that “No person shall distribute any handbill . . . upon any street ...” was held to be prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. See further Jamison v. State of Texas (1943), 318 U.S. 413 [ 63 S.Ct. 669 , 87 L.Ed. 869 ].

Then, too, the fact that the section immediately involved essays to prohibit the distribution of handbills, and not their publication, will not serve to save it. Ex parte Jackson (1878), 96 U.S. 727, 733 [ 24 L.Ed. 877, 879 ] ; Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra,…