Dawson

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I cannot agree that In re Newbern (1959), 175 Cal.App.2d 862 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 80 ], requires this result since the basic rule of that ease is merely that he is entitled to “a reasonable opportunity to attempt to procure a timely sample,” which was afforded him in this case. However, the next logical step in the development of that principle is to afford each side an opportunity to take a blood sample and without the other side being able to delay the test. The majority opinion gives to the defendant full protection and at the same time assures to the prosecution either a prompt test or the right to an instruction to the jury as to the infer *884 enee which may be drawn from a refusal. This clarification of the rights of both sides is a forward step in the development of the law.

The defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle Code, section 23102, subdivision (a). He appeals from the judgment and the order denying a new trial. The judgment should be reversed with directions to dismiss Municipal Court action No. M-15884 for two reasons among others: (1) That the hearsay statements contained in the statutory notice of revocation of defendant’s driver’s license were permitted to be read to the jury at the outset of the trial over defendant’s objections and before said notice had been received in evidence. It should not have been in evidence at all as to Count I as it was clearly prejudicial. (2) It is uncontradicted that defendant requested his own doctor be called who was in Downey where the arrest took place, at his own expense, that his request was not granted; that he wanted his doctor to be present at the blood test as a witness thereto and for her to have a sample of it. The opinion in In re Newbern (1959), 175 Cal.App.2d 862 , states at page 866 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 80 ]: “While there is no duty or obligation on the law enforcement agencies to give a blood test under these circumstances, the arrested person, on his own behalf, should be entitled to a…