This is an appeal from an order dismissing an order to show cause wherein appellant wife sought a modification of the provisions of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce relating to alimony and attorney’s fees. The order dismissing the order to show cause was made with *344 out the taking of any testimony, the trial court holding that the provisions of the decrees were not subject to modification as a matter of law because the property settlement agreement incorporated into the divorce decrees was fully integrated. Appellant concedes that the property settlement agreement has been merged into the decrees by virtue of the language thereof.

The issues presented by the parties are: (1) whether the alimony and property settlement provisions of the instant agreement were integrated, and (2) whether the terms of the agreement are such as to indicate the intent of the parties that the alimony provisions remained subject to modification.

The resolution of these questions calls for an examination and analysis of the agreement here involved. It is recited that ‘ ‘ [t] he parties hereto desire, by this agreement, to settle and adjust, as between themselves, their respective property rights, and to provide for the future support of wife.” The community property is enumerated and described and provision is made for its division between the parties. Paragraph 9 reads as follows:

Paragraphs 10 and 11 relate to custody and support of the minor child of the parties and paragraph 12 is entitled “Releases of Rights.” The pertinent provisions of paragraph 12 read as follows:

From the quoted language of the agreement it appears to us that the parties clearly intended that the provisions of the agreement relating to alimony were severable and subject to modification upon a proper showing. In view of the emphasized provisions quoted from the agreement, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether it should be characterized as “integrated.” The intent of the parties that the support provisions should remain subject to modification is so clearly and unequivocally expressed in paragraphs 9 and 12d that there seems to be no room for reasonable doubt. It has been *346 held repeatedly that a support order, even though based upon an integrated agreement, may be modified if the parties so provide. (Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55, 61 [ 265 P.2d 865 ]; Plumer v. Plumer, 48 Cal.2d 820, 825 [ 313 P.2d 549 ].)

We find no merit in respondent’s argument that plaintiff’s right to seek modification is limited only to a maximum of $325 per month provided to be paid if the wife’s gross income does not exceed $75 for that month. We find nothing in the terms of the agreement to indicate any intent to impose such a limitation.

The order dismissing appellant’s application for modification is reversed.

Fox, P. J., and Ashburn, J., concurred.