This is an appeal from an order inr structing personal representatives with respect to distribution of the estate. The trial judge held that the appellants, Long Beach Day Nursery, Adelaide Tiehenor Home for Crippled *692 Children, and First Congregational Church of Long Beach, hereinafter referred to as the Three Charities, were residuary legatees and the respondents, Robert L. Taft and Stella E. Taft, hereinafter referred to as the Tafts, were given a specific bequest. Based on that holding the trial court instructed the executor to charge both taxes and expenses of administration to the gift to the Three Charities. Taxes were chargeable to the residue because of an express provision in a codicil, and expenses were so chargeable because of section 750, Probate Code.

The sole issue on appeal, as stated by respondents is: “Was the trial court correct in ruling that the bequest to The Tafts is a specific one while the gift to the Three Charities is a residuary one?” (Italics are those of respondents.)

The parties agree that since there was no extrinsic evidence, the intent of the testatrix is one of law for us to determine from the will and codicils. There are three testamentary instruments for us to construe. First—The will of 1927 provides in pertinent part:

All agree that under the original will the gift to the Three Charities is residuary.

Second—The 1932 codicil provides in pertinent part:

There is still no disagreement in interpretation. All agree that the Three Charities up to this point were residuary. Between this date and the date of the next codicil, the brother and two sisters died. This made the testamentary *693 trust unnecessary but still left the Three Charities residuary legatees.

Third—The 1960 codicil provides in pertinent part:

The trust referred to in this codicil was not in existence at the time of the original will and the 1932 codicil. It was an inter vivos trust, the testatrix being trustor and beneficiary, and at her death the assets were to go to her executor or administrator. At the time of death it contained assets appraised at over $180,000 and the nontrust property consisted of assets appraised at over $50,000, as shown by the “Inventory and Appraisement’’ in the record.

Our problem is whether this codicil changed the gift to the Three Charities into a specific legacy and created a new residuary legatee, the Tafts. We hold that it did.

Since the residue is to be charged with both taxes and expenses, both appellants and respondents argue that their legacy is the specific one and the others receive the residue. They rely on the same rules of construction and argue that' the intent of the testatrix is clear when the three testamentary documents are considered. Appellants stress the language of the 1960 codicil and argue that it is both later than and inconsistent with the earlier documents. They point out that if additional property had been acquired or discovered it would go to the Tafts under the express language of the 1960 codicil, thereby demonstrating that the Tafts are residuary. (See Prob. Code, § 161, subd. (4).) They point out also that if at the time of death there had been no trust or trust property, the legacy to the Three Charities would have failed, thereby demonstrating that the Three Charities received only a specific bequest under the 1960 codicil. (See Prob. Code, §161, subd. (1).) Respondents do not directly *694 answer these points, hut stress the clear (and undisputed) meaning of the earlier documents and argue that the basic intent and plan thereof has not been changed. They point out that under the terms of the original will there was a “testamentary plan,” so important to the testatrix that she left only one dollar to any person who opposed it. Respondents further argue that this plan involved giving certain specific property to a brother and two sisters and giving a residuum through the use of a trust to the Three Charities. It is their argument that this “testamentary plan” has not. been fundamentally changed by the 1960 codicil. The Tafts are substituted for the brother and sisters and given their specific gift, and the Three Charities get everything in the trust, just as before. They argue that we are not concerned with the meaning of, mere individual words, but we are concerned with the intent of the testatrix and that her intent has not changed since her “testamentary plan” is still intact. All concede that under the original plan the Three Charities are residuary and, since there has been no basic change, the respondents argue that the Three Charities are still residuary within the intent and meaning of the will.

There are two very serious fallacies in such argument:

The order is reversed.

Ashburn, Acting P. J., and Herndon, J., concurred.

Respondents' petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 18, 1963.

Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.