Appellant, in a trial by jury, was convicted of four counts of violating Penal Code, sections 484 and 487, subdivision 1: Grand Theft. He appeals from the judgment.

On numerous occasions beginning in 1959 and ending in 1961, appellant placed advertisements in local newspapers as follows: “Shrimp hauls, L.A.-N.Y., two weeks on, two weeks off, $800.00 a month net, $3,500 required. . . . ’ ’

*598 On four occasions which constitute the basis for the criminal action at bench, the four separate victims answered said advertisement. When appellant met each victim, he represented to each severally that in exchange for $3,500 he would transfer to each a one-half interest in a truck owned by appellant and thereafter the truck thus jointly owned by appellant and the victim would be used exclusively by the victim to make hauls of shrimp in a two-week round-trip schedule to the East coast and that each haul would net a profit of $800.

Appellant also represented to each victim that each would have return loads from the East, that they would work on a two week on and two week off basis and that the hauls would involve frozen foods exclusively.

The testimony showed that each of the victims did in reliance upon said representations enter into written contracts with appellant and paid to him the money required to purchase a one-half interest in a truck for the purpose of hauling shrimp. All of the representations were false and none of the representations were fulfilled. The record shows that appellant did not own any interest in any truck in respect of which he purported to convey a one-half interest to each victim here involved.

The written agreement which each victim was required to sign provided for the return of the $3,500 on two weeks’ notice. As each victim in turn discovered that he was chasing an illusion and actually had no one-half ownership interest in the truck which had been allegedly transferred, each victim in turn gave notice as required by the written contract and requested a return of the money invested. No part of such investment was returned.

Appellant maintained that he never represented that he had actual contracts with third persons to haul shrimp but only “arrangements”; that the contracts he signed with each victim transferring ownership in the trucks were only temporary agreements which would later be made final on the happening of certain events; and that the $800 per month net profit to be made by each driver was only an estimated figure. In essence, appellant’s defense at the trial was, and it is the same before this court, that he had not made any representations with intent to defraud but that in each case a legitimate business venture had been entered into but had not fruitified.

Appellant’s primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. In our opinion the lengthy record before us, totaling some 800 pages, abundantly establishes the contrary.

*599 As the court said in People v. Hambleton, 218 Cal.App.2d 479 , at page 481 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 471 ] : “It is apparent that the defendant would have this court reweigh conflicting evidence, which is for the trier of facts, and not within the province of a reviewing court which determines only whether there were sufficient facts proved to warrant the inference of guilt. (People v. Kemp, 124 Cal.App.2d 683 [ 269 P.2d 186 ]).”

Appellant asserts that he had no intent to defraud and that an intent to defraud was not established.

In Hambleton, supra, the court at page 481 also says: “To establish the commission of the crime of grand theft sounding in false pretenses, it must be proved that: the defendant made false representations of past events or existing facts, as distinguished from a mere expression of opinion or promise of future action; the representations were made with intent to defraud the owner of his property; and that the owner was actually defrauded in that he parted with his property in reliance upon the false representations. [Citations.] ...”

The record abounds with direct testimony of the victims and circumstantial evidence from which the false representations made by appellant as to the terms of the driving contracts and his ownership of the trucks. In addition, his alleged transfer of an interest in trucks which he did not own, to each victim, coupled with appellant’s' subsequent refusal to return the $3,500 as provided in each contract, were in themselves sufficient to support a finding of intent to defraud without reference to the representation to each victim that each would earn a profit of $800 per month which appellant asserts was an expression of opinion. (People v. Hambleton, supra; People v. Davis, 112 Cal.App.2d 286 [ 246 P.2d 160 ].)

Appellant also contends that the court erred on restricting his attempts to develop certain evidentiary matters considered by him to be crucial to his defenses.

Appellant attempted to introduce testimony of a Mr. Graves to the effect that Graves and appellant had entered into an agreement in January 1961, similar to those in the case at bench and that this agreement between Graves and appellant was satisfactory to both parties. Appellant argues that such evidence would show that his deals with the victims here involved were not reckless and would evidence the fact that net profit could be earned from each trip. This type of evidence is neither relevant nor probative to establish good faith or lack of criminal intent in respect of the four fraudulent acts here involved especially in the absence of a foundation showing *600 the eircumstanees to be identical to the situation of the four here victimized. No such foundation was laid or offered.

Appellant also contends that the court erred in refusing to allow his wife to corroborate appellant’s testimony that subsequent to the four frauds he lost most of what he owned as a result of his part in the trucking business. As with the prior contention, however, this evidence was irrelevant to the issue of intent to defraud in respect of the transaction for which appellant was tried. On the record before us, its logical relevance could be that appellant carelessly managed his fraudulent activities. In People v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219 , the court says at page 222 [ 266 P.2d 38 ] : “ ‘All facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids.’ (1 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed. 1940], § 10, p. 293; and cf. Code Civ. Proc., § 1868.) The general test of relevancy of indirect evidence is whether it tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove a material issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1832; People v. Eldridge, 147 Cal. 782, 784 [ 82 P. 442 ]; People v. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 398 [ 77 P. 177 ]; cf. People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 315 [ 169 P.2d 924 ].)”

The only remaining question is whether the rule of People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 , 398 P.2d 361 ], has any application to this case. The question is not raised in the briefs, but since it is pregnant in the record of the case and may be raised in future proceedings, we address ourselves to it.

Officer Connor testified to an interview with appellant after arrest en route to the police station and in a subsequent interview at the station. The record is silent as to whether appellant at either time was advised of his right to counsel or to remain silent or that he effectively waived either. The testimony of Officer Daniels on this subject in full is as follows:

The only facts which appellant admitted to the officer were those as to which documentary proof was available and which were never in issue. He subsequently testified to substantially the same effect as a witness in his own behalf. He in no way admitted any degree of guilt but denied making the oral representations imputed to him and stoutly maintained his innocence on exactly the same theory which he maintained during the trial and maintains on this appeal. Thus, the following analysis of appellant’s defense is set forth in the opening paragraph of the argument contained in his brief filed herein:

In the circumstances here detailed we feel Dorado and the eases following it have no application.

The judgment is affirmed.

Herndon, J., and Fleming, J., concurred.