Botka

R. C. appeals from an order of the juvenile court committing him to the Youth Authority after it had been determined that he had set fire to two structures; appellant was found to be a minor within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.

*891 The evidence is not in conflict. At about 3:40 a.m., February 26, 1973, two police officers patrolling the area of O’Farrell and Fillmore Streets, in San Francisco, observed a young man standing in the partly opened doorway of a building and looking inside. The young man turned and walked across the street where he joined another boy. The officers stopped them, asked for their names, dates of birth and addresses, and asked what they were doing. After the boys had identified themselves as R. C. and J. J., the officers placed them in the back of the police vehicle and explained that they were being detained while the officers checked further into what they had been doing. Appellant had been identified to one of the officers earlier that evening as a possible suspect in a series of fires that had been set in the Fillmore area.

Inspecting the doorway where J. J. had first been seen, the officers observed fresh…

I dissent.

Appellant has been subjected to wardship of the juvenile court upon its factual determination, reached on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony only, that he had “violate[d] . . . [a] . . . law of this state” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) in that he had committed the crime of arson proscribed by Penal Code section 447a.

*898 I agree with the majority that the adjudication did not operate to deprive appellant of due process of law, as guaranteed him under the Fourteenth Amendment, by reason of its having been based upon such testimony alone. (See Lisenba v. California (1941) 314 U.S. 219, 226-227 [ 86 L.Ed. 166, 174-175 , 62 S.Ct. 280 ]; In re M. (1970) 34 App.Div.2d 761 [ 310 N.Y.S.2d 399, 401-402 ] [concurring opinion].) I do not agree with the full import of the majority’s statements (1) that “[t]he different purposes of the juvenile system may . . . justify reasonable differences in procedure so long as due process standards are met,” or (2) that “[t]he purposes and structure of the juvenile system are different from the adult criminal justice system. Hence when due process has been satisfied reasonable differences in procedures are not unconstitutional.”…