Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services v. Janet D.

This is an appeal by a mother from judgments making her two sons, aged 14 and 10, dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 600, and placing them in the custody of the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) for suitable placement. The single issue requiring discussion is the admissibility of the testimony of a clinical psychologist who had examined appellant during the pendency of the proceedings.

Appellant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. Our examination of the record satisfies us that the evidence is sufficient, and no purpose would be served in detailing it in this opinion.

The record shows that, over a period of years, appellant had suffered from mental problems, for which she had been a hospital patient on at least three occasions. In April 1971 she had signed a voluntary placement order permitting the DPSS to place the minors in a foster home. In November 1974 appellant notified DPSS that she desired to regain physical custody. At that time neither of the respective fathers was involved in looking after the minors. DPSS thereupon initiated this proceeding under Welfare and Institutions…

I dissent.

The major issue before us is the correctness of the juvenile court’s ruling that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was not available in the proceedings below to support the claim of privilege made by the *17 appellant-patient in an effort to preclude testimony by Dr. Cramer, her psychotherapist. The juvenile court ruled that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would have been applicable to preclude the testimony of Dr. Cramer had not the exception to this privilege applied—the exception set forth in Evidence Code section 1024 for the situation where the psychotherapist determines that the patient is dangerous to himself or others. The majority upholds the juvenile court’s ruling on the ground—not relied upon by the juvenile court—that Evidence Code section 1012, which defines a “confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist,” specifically authorized disclosure to the juvenile court of any communication from the appellant-patient to Dr. Cramer and Dr. Cramer’s diagnosis of her mental or emotional condition. The majority deemed it unnecessary, therefore, for the appellate court to consider the applicability of the dangerous-patient exception to the…