49er Chevrolet v. New Motor Vehicle Board

I dissent. 49er Chevrolet (49er) has been found to have violated Vehicle Code section 11713, subdivision (g), as amended in 1972, which declares unlawful certain types of conduct by licensed dealers, manufacturers, and transporters of vehicles. While the majority fail to find a purpose for the 1972 amendment to section 11713, subdivision (g), I believe that the Legislature intended to provide further safeguards against a dealer’s profiting by the addition of license and transfer fees to the purchase price of a vehicle.

In the interpretation of an act of the Legislature we must consider the policies and purposes of the act. The applicable rule of statutory construction is that the purpose sought to be achieved and evils to be eliminated have an important place in ascertaining the legislative intent. (Freedland v. Greco (1955) 45 Cal.2d 462, 476 [ 289 P.2d 463 ].) Statutes should be interpreted to promote rather than defeat the legislative purpose and policy, and construction of a statute which affords an opportunity to evade the act should be avoided in favor of construction which would defeat subterfuges, expediencies, or evasions employed to continue the mischief sought to be…

*87 Opinion

With a perversity born of adversity, 49er Chevrolet (49er), an automobile dealer, has tried over the past four years to avoid a decision of this case on its merits. (See 49er Chevrolet v. Office of Administrative Procedure (Apr. 1, 1977) 3 Civ. 15927 [unpub. opn.].) Even in this appeal in which the merits are finally before us, 49er manages to conceal its most potent arguments in a blizzard of constitutional mutterings about the contract clause. It need not have labored so mightily, for on the merits 49er will prevail.

49er appeals from a judgment of the Sacramento County Superior Court refusing to issue a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) to overturn a decision of the defendant New Motor Vehicle Board (Board). That decision affirmed a finding (and the accompanying penalty) of the real party in interest Department of Motor Vehicles (Department) that 49er had violated Vehicle Code section 11713, subdivision (g).

Two transactions of 49er led to the administrative action. The first, which we designate the “Hilmanofski-Johnson” transaction, involved a lease of a Chevrolet pickup by 49er 1 to Phillip Hilmanofski on September 20, 1973. 49er at…